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Science in Engineering and Management
ABSTRACT
In the nuclear, aerospace and chemical industries, the need for risk management is
straightforward. When a system failure mode may cause a very high cost in lives or economic
value, risk management becomes a necessity. In its short history, Information Technology (IT)
came to be a crucial part and sometimes the platform of business activities for many large
companies such as telecommunication or financial services organizations. However, due to
scale and complexity, risk management methods used by other industries are not widely
applied in IT.
In this thesis, we investigate how probabilistic risk assessments methods used in other
industries can be applied to IT network environments. A comparison is done using a number
of possible approaches, improvements to these approaches are suggested, and different
tradeoffs are discussed. The thesis examines ways to apply probabilistic risk assessment to a
Service Oriented Architecture environment (where each service is an application or a business
process that depends on other services, local and networked resources) to estimate the service
reliability, availability, expected costs over time and the importance measures of elements and
configurations. Finally, a method of performing cost benefit analysis is presented to estimate
the implication of changing the services-supporting infrastructure, while taking into
consideration the varying impact of different services to the business.
A case study is used to demonstrate the methods suggested in the thesis. The case study
compares four different configurations, showing how equipment failure and human error can
be placed into a single framework and addressed as a single system. The implications and
application of the results are discussed and recommendations for further research are
provided.
Thesis Supervisor:
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INTRODUCTION
Background
For most companies today, Information Technology (IT) is one of the most important
infrastructures of the organization. As technology progresses and becomes ubiquitous, an
increasing number of operations that used to take place in the physical world are performed in
the virtual world. There are different opinions about whether or not IT by itself is strategic to
the organization, but few argue with the claim that innovative usage of IT can lead to a
strategic advantage even if temporary (Carr, 2003). There are a number of examples for
strategic advantages that were created using IT infrastructure like Wal-Mart and Dell with
vertical integration, airlines with on-demand price adjusting ticketing systems, and others.
For some types of organizations, IT is an enabler for a substantial part of their business. For
example, the banking sector is composed of organizations that are information intensive and a
large part of their business uses IT extensively. Although the banking industry operated
successfully prior to the existence of computer networks, in today's technological landscape it
is unlikely that a bank can use its assets effectively without it. For other industries, IT is an
inseparable part of the business. An example for such an industry is the telecommunication
industry. With large carriers, the majority of the business is carried over IT infrastructures.
Without it, carriers would not have been able to operate altogether.
As an organization grows and becomes a more sophisticated user of IT, it may start using
applications that are more and more business-critical'. Consequently, it becomes less and less
tolerant to disruption at the IT service level because of possible financial impact as well as
other less tangible ramifications, such as negative impact on reputation and customer
satisfaction.
Problem Statement
Information Technology infrastructure is extensively shared between many services (for
example, see page 33, Figure 2 - Two services sharing network infrastructure). The same
1 The definition of 'business critical' here is something that enables an important part of business operations and without it, the
business would be disrupted in a way that has financial ramifications.
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equipment is being used for many types of business processes. As a result, in many cases the
infrastructures become complex and contains many interdependencies.
Common best practices lead organizations to use risk management where business critical
services are implemented. Usually a part of the risk management is done by introducing
multiple layers of redundancy into the infrastructure and by doing so, ensuring that services
will keep on running if a part of the infrastructure fails. However, a byproduct of the
redundancy is a substantial addition to the infrastructure complexity.
It is very common to see such infrastructures going through very frequent changes (Wallin and
Leijon, 2006) driven by business needs. At the same time, these infrastructures are dealing with
high scale of information transfer, in terms of amount of data and in terms of how many end
users or services are connected to the infrastructure.
As a result of the infrastructure scale, complexity and redundancy, issues originating from
equipment failure or human errors around logical and physical configuration changes, will
remain undetected until an actual interruption of service occurs (Reason, 1990, p 179). The
latent quality issues lead to unknown financial exposure (stochastic expected loss) to the
organization and misalignment between IT management and the organization business goals.
Today there is no standard analytic way of measuring and managing that exposure.
Problem Importance
In the nuclear industry, the concept and need for risk management is almost straightforward.
Under proper management, a nuclear reactor provides tremendous benefits but if miss-
managed, the results can be disastrous. The same logic applied to many aerospace initiatives
and large hazardous chemical installations. When a system's failure mode(s) may cause a very
high cost in lives or economic value, risk management becomes a necessity. In its short history,
Information Technology (IT) came to be a crucial part and sometimes the platform of
business activities for many large companies. Addressing this problem and providing better
tools to measure risk and benefit as a function of the individual components of the system, the
system's topology and the human behavior that is a part of the system, will provide a way to
measure service-oriented system robustness and quality of service and open opportunities for
more proactive management practices such as Six Sigma. It may also allow measuring the
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expected risk in terms of financial value and improve communication between management,
business units and IT management. Furthermore, an epistemic approach to underlying
stochastic assumptions may assist organizations with measuring their improvement over time.
Finally, in a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) environment, where business processes are
composed of small distributed services, using a certain service as a building block does not
only imply using its functionality, but also assuming the reliability and availability characteristics
of that service. These characteristics are often ignored, or may change over time and the newly
formed business process may have unknown level of quality. Knowing the service risk profile
will allow building bigger systems while making the right architectural decisions.
Conceptual Framework
This thesis aims to achieve the following:
1. Analyze probabilistic risk analysis methods used in industries such as nuclear,
aerospace and chemicals to see whether these methods can be adapted to IT
infrastructures and how this may be accomplished.
2. Examine how to address IT infrastructure as a single system that is affected both by
technical issues as well as human behavior dynamics in a business environment.
3. Suggest enhancements to existing methods and create a new method to estimate risk in
service oriented, complex and frequently-changing IT infrastructures.
In the process of achieving the above goals, the following questions were explored:
1. What is the implication of a change in the infrastructure, with regards to the following
aspects:
a. The implication of a change on the profile of different services, in terms of
reliability and availability.
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
D 2007 Gadi Oren
Introduction
b. How does a change to the infrastructure effect the financial exposure
(expected loss), or benefit to the business, considering that some services (or
business processes) may have a different business impact than others.
2. How can the traditional concept of a problem root-cause be broadened to include
physical events, human errors and logical configuration events?
3. What is the importance of different infrastructure components and logical
configurations and how can it be measured?
4. How can risk be successfully managed to reduce exposure (expected losses), and what
are the tradeoffs?
5. How can the calculated exposure (expected losses) be used for cost benefit assessment.
The following methodology was used:
1. Related work was reviewed to examine previous research.
2. A number of possible methodologies were considered and the most appropriate was
selected.
3. Modifications to existing methodologies were considered to formalize a new method
that can address the thesis goals and research questions.
4. A framework was developed using the suggested method to allow finding of the
required measurements, incorporating both the network physical model, logical model
and the effects of human behavior on the managed infrastructure.
5. The suggested method was compared with traditional PRA, using a very simple
comparison case.
6. A case study was chosen to demonstrate the result measurements.
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7. Conclusions were drawn and recommendations presented based on the results.
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RELATED WORK - LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter describes the research that was done in the subject, what were the data gathering
and research methodologies and conclusions. Key findings that are relevant to the subject of
this thesis are reviewed in the context of the thesis. As this thesis brings a wide array of
subjects together, it is not the intention of the review to provide full detailed review of each
one of the individual subjects.
Reliability of network infrastructure using PRA
A number of papers were found related to application of PRA methods to network
infrastructures such as computer communication, power transmission, transportation, oil, gas
or water production and delivery, and logistical networks. In their paper (Jain and Gopal,
1988), Jain and Gopal describe an algorithm that allows finding the minimal cut-set for Binary
State Networks (BSN). Then, using the nodes probability model, global reliability can be
calculated. While the algorithm is more efficient than previous algorithms (Aggarwal and Rai,
1981) its complexity and the amount of mathematical operations required to find reliability is
related to the number of spanning trees in the network. Depending on the network topology,
the number of spanning trees in a network bears an exponential relationship to the number of
arcs and nodes, and thus the method is only applicable to small problems. Additional
algorithms for accurate probability calculation were suggested by Ball (Ball, 1979), Buzacott
(Buzacott, 1980), Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 1977), Satyanarayana (Satyanarayana, 1982) and
Hasanuddin (Hasanuddin, 1988). All these methods have a similar issue of an exponential
computational complexity. Generally, the problem of accurate calculation of reliability for a
network is NP-hard (Ball, 1979). Furthermore, the space required for the calculations is often
very large, and even when this issues are resolved, the excessive amount of calculations result
in accumulation of round off errors and inaccurate results (Shanthikumar, 1988).
In order to address these issues Shanthikumar (Shanthikumar, 1988) proposes a different
approach that calculates only the lower bound (LBR) and upper bound (UBR) of the network
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reliability. Additional work in this field was done in order to further improve the efficiency of
the algorithms and the tightness of the bounds found (Elmallah and AboElFotoh, 2006).
Another area of research is the Multi State Networks (MSN). With MSN, the assumption is
that each component has a certain capacity and that capacity may change with a certain
probability (hence - a multi state element). With some systems (for example water delivery
network) the change in capacity may be continuous. In order to simplify the problem, the
continuous range of capacity is usually broken down into discrete steps, represented as a state.
Nevertheless, under that assumption the notion of 'failure' becomes more complex and is
usually defined with relation to with how much capacity is required between two terminals for
the network to serve its goal: capacity related reliability (Soh and Rai, 2005). Furthermore, the
complexity issues with Binary State Networks, mentioned above, dramatically increases as a
result of the amount of possible spanned combinatorial states (Colbourn, 1987). As before, in
order to avoid the complexity, the approach taken by many researchers is to focus on the LBR
- lower bound reliability (Satitsatian and Kapur, 2006) for a Multi State Network (MSN).
Other methods for network infrastructure reliability assessment
An alternative method to PRA was examined by a number of researchers, in the context of
network related systems. In order to deal with the inherent complexity of the problem, a
simulation is performed to produce the network functionality results in different conditions.
Monte Carlo Method (MC) is used iteratively to create component level failures (based on
individual component failure probability), and simulation to find network functionality and
enable estimation of network reliability. In their paper (Zio et al, 2006), Zio et al assert that
while this subject can be addressed using PRA and information about the system's cut-sets,
path-sets or depth first methods, these approaches are NP-hard (Non deterministic
polynomial-time hard) problems, and require mathematically intensive methods for any real
life systems. The paper is dealing with a new approach to overcome these issues - using
cellular automata (CA) - from general class of mathematical models that are used in modeling
various types of complex systems. The paper limits the problem space to a single source -
single target network and verifies a binary existence of connection between source and target.
Another assumption is that the system is a renewable network and that broken nodes or arcs
are fixed after a time that is a simple independent random variable. Using CA and Monte Carlo
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(MC) simulation, it is possible to estimate reliability and availability of the system, as well as
estimating importance measures.
Next, the authors describe how CA is used to find single source to single target connection.
The stochastic failure model of arches and nodes is used to perform MC analysis and estimate
reliability. Reliability is calculated as the number of scenarios with a resulting connection, over
the total number of all scenarios. In order to find reliability, the paper uses the assumption of
an independent random variable (that is identical to all components) that determines break to
fix time. Then, a set of random walks are produced according to that stochastic model. Each
random walk is limited in time but may have unknown number of steps. Along every system
stochastic transition, the system connection state is found using CA simulation. The results are
placed in a lattice of fixed time intervals, and the availability can be found per each time
interval, and for the entire timeline. The paper explains how CA is very efficient in finding the
new state after a small change to the network, as change propagation is sufficient to find the
system state instead of a full blown calculation.
The authors also present a number of importance measures and explain how they can be
calculated within the same framework. A case study is used to show availability, reliability, and
the importance measures (Risk Achievement Worth, Risk Reduction Worth, Fussell-Vesely
and Birnbaum), along with a discussion of their implications. In the conclusions, two
approaches to risk management are suggested: the first is to invest in areas that proved to
influence availability and measures, and the second is to further 'sacrifice' the areas that proved
to be non-influential.
The authors offer an alternative to the traditional PRA for network systems. The rationale and
benefits of using this methodology are explained and demonstrated well. The context of this
thesis is related to the application of IT infrastructure networks and their usage as a platform
for business activity. Within that context, the proposed model may not be general enough
because of a number of points:
1. The way that reliability is found hides an implicit assumption that the behavior of the
system is immutable over time (for example - the stochastic model of break to fix).
This assumption limits the ability to investigate system where there is a dependency on
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time or external events that depend on time. Specifically, when the event of fixing an
element depends on people's awareness to the failure, or human behavior patterns, this
model may not be sufficient.
2. The proposed model is a very hardware driven model. In today's networks, many
issues may be caused by a logical configuration change (see: Redundancy Types,
Logical). A changed logical configuration will not be a "broken" network element, but
still be a cause for loss of redundancy or even a lost connection. As such, most of the
value metrics do not apply to logical configuration change the way they apply to
element break, because there is no notion of 'reliability' to a logical configuration
change. It is functioning as designed even when it is causing a system level failure. This
model does not lend itself well to systems that include a complex set of logical rules
overlaying the physical structure.
3. In order to find availability, a part of the suggested method is to use discrete time
periods, but no insight is offered into how to choose them or information on the
relation between the selected time period and the amount of MC cycles required.
4. The model is trying to enable usage in real world systems but the failure mode of each
node and arc are too simplistic. In many network applications the nodes and arcs may
have internal structure that affects their activity. Furthermore, the internal structure
will likely impose different failure characteristics for different nodes and arcs and will
add dependencies.
5. In an environment where a logical configuration change event may be a cause of an
issue, the provided importance measures may not be a good measure for both
hardware failure and logical configuration change event.
6. Finding the measurements for extremely rare events may be difficult as a result of very
low amount of data points.
7. When using this methodology for IT infrastructures, the network will be used by a
large number of 'services'. Each network element (physical or logical configuration)
will be shared by these services, and these services may carry very different economic
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value to the organization. In order to be used by upper level management, the
importance measurements should be enhanced to reflect true economic value as they
affect a cluster of services.
The methodology presented in this paper is promising and may be used with IT infrastructure
networks. However, in the context of this thesis, enhancements to the proposed model and its
assumptions must be incorporated to allow real world applications.
IT infrastructures complexity and architecture
For a number of industries, the IT infrastructure and network are constantly changing,
growing and become more complex. At the same time, business pressures require the network
services to be as reliable as a utility, while cost savings dictate faster turn around time and
fewer expenses on operations. In their paper "Rethinking Network Management Solutions", (
Wallin and Leijon, 2006), Wallin and Leijon, discuss these subjects in the Telecom industry.
The research methodology used was gathering data by interviewing Telecom Operators,
drawing qualitative conclusions from these interviews (an example to a Telecom Operator
would be Verizon, although no specific Telecom Operator is mentioned in the paper). The
authors define three types of users to networks in the Telecom industry: The network operators,
which must earn money on their services, the network service users (business and customer), who
pay for services and the network administrators, who staff the network operations center. The
authors present a current problem in this industry around the following issues: A. the network
generates 100,000 to 1,000,000 alarms a day (see explanation in the next paragraph) (!), B. the
network changes constantly, C. there is a very complex service structure, D. Customer
interaction and SLA (Service Level Agreement) management is very difficult, E. Cost
reduction - smaller teams manage larger networks, F. Multiple interfaces and lack of sufficient
standards.
An alarm is a diagnostic notification that can be sent from any piece of equipment in the IT
network infrastructure. The alarm is usually a message that the equipment manufacturer
estimated may be of value in certain conditions to the network administrators or operators.
For example, the following events will generate an alarm (a very small subset of the full list): a
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loss of signal on a network connection, re-establish connection, a change in logical
configuration, failure to negotiate a protocol with another equipment element, internal fan or
power supply failure, hi or low communication buffer levels. Many network failure or change
situations may lead to 'event-storms' - detailed alarms sent from multiple equipment elements.
Alarms, as they are generated today, are raw, uncorrelated and flood the operators with too
much information and no context. This is creating more load and little benefit in performing
RCA (root cause analysis). The alarms are not prioritized according to their impact on the
business (or SLAs) and no topological information related to the alarms is kept. As a result, the
escalation process (the process of event triage to classify and address the most urgent issues
first) is heavily dependent of human experts and distributed across multiple departments.
Furthermore, because the alarms are generated from an equipment element that does not
understand the context in which it is working, alarms are cryptic and provide no hint with
regards to the root cause. This leads to steep training and productivity cost incurred by
operators.
Telecom IT infrastructure networks are in a state of constant change. Different business and
technical requirements drive daily changes that are very challenging to operators - constantly
changing the network while keeping all existing services running. The expected time-to-change
moved from months to hours. Very few operators have change management practices fully
implemented, and new elements that are introduced to the network drive new unfamiliar types
of alarms. Although SLA is signed and paid for in contracts, the network management and the
IT infrastructure today provides no assistance in the actual management of the SLA. Some
operators are starting to implement methodologies such as Information Technology
Infrastructure Library (ITIL) to deal with change management.
Complex service structure is mentioned as an underlying problem in network management
solutions according to interviewed operators. The operators do not have real visibility of
services across processes and systems. Operators are looking for a service management or
even an SLA management oriented solution. Several issues should be resolved to achieve this:
A. Network topology management - mapping network elements relations, B. service
management - mapping services relations and SLAs and C. a services centric management to
18 Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
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all activities such as customer care, fault management and others. Customer interaction
requires transparent high level billing and status reporting in a customer consumable way.
The authors suggest a number of ways to improve but states that the field has to go through a
paradigm shift and start using a different set of principals. Service model and real time status
should provide mapping of resources, network topology and customers. For example, a service
that is an aggregated set of services should present the proper severity as a result of the service
topology. A high severity event on a low importance sub service may ultimately mean a
medium severity event from the top level service point of view. The topology and changes to
the topology is mentioned as something that should be a core component, but according to
the authors, existing solutions do not handle that important aspect today. The paper also
enumerate a number of other factors that should improve such as better standards, allowing to
manage heterogeneous networks with dynamic services, and high frequency change
management. Another issue today is the fact that the system relay on human experts that take
years to acquire their level of knowledge, but this knowledge is hard to reuse because of the
manual nature of the operations today. Operators need more automated solutions in the form
of expert systems that are self learning and self adapting.
In summary, the authors state that the Telecom industry changed from network management
to service management, and operators need solutions that are working from a service point of
view allowing automated RCA and correlation to service impact.
Short-term goals vs. mid- and long-term goals
A number of papers discuss the constant predicament that is faced by management at different
levels: with a limited amount of resources what is the right balance of resource allocations
towards short-term, mid-term and long-term goals? Investing in short term goals is very
compelling since the results can usually be measured within a timeframe of a quarter. In their
article (Lordish and Mela, 2007), Lordish and Mela discuss the fact that some business
activities such as building a brand name are inherently long, while at the same time, the
management is being measured on a quarterly financial performance metrics. This places the
management in a difficult situation whenever an investment for a long term is required,
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especially if it hurts the short term performance. A solution that is commonly used is creating
balanced score cards that measure not only the immediate impact of resources that were
invested for the short term, but also other measurements that are by nature more long term.
Although this paper considers operations that are non engineering related - the 'marketing
infrastructure', the principle applies to any type of infrastructures. Reason also mentions the
same issue in his book (Reason, 1990) when discussing the fact that safety issues are always
mid-term issues with a feedback loop that is both very long as well as hard to associate in
terms of cause and effect. As a result, in a production environment, the short term result
created by increasing production capabilities over investing in maintenance or safety, is a path
that is chosen often by management. Reason posits that these choices are, in many cases
contributors to later accidents.
In a paper by Repenning and Sterman (Repenning and Sterman, 2001), the authors presents a
behavioral pattern called the 'Capability Trap'. The pattern may happen when an organization
starts leaning excessively towards short term thinking, investing more in short term results
over long term infrastructures and capabilities. While this provides the expected short term
result, the organization is slowly losing capabilities, and in order to perpetuate the short term
results, more and more short term efforts are required. This leads to a "better-before-worse"
situation, where the emphasis is around 'work harder'. This cycle is very hard to reverse
because it requires a recognition and acceptance from the organization that a long "worse-
before-better" cycle is required where the emphasis will be 'work smarter'. The authors discuss
how companies build long term capabilities through process improvements, and hypothesize
that a set of powerful thinking patterns drive companies into the 'Capability Trap', where the
capability can be related to different types of organizational infrastructures such as engineering,
marketing, sales and other capabilities. Repenning and Sterman present a case study on Du
Pont, where in 1991, Du Pont was spending 10-30% more than industry average on
maintenance while the uptime of plants was 10-15% lower than industry average. Du Pont was
deep into a capability trap that stemmed from the preceding economic and industry
conditions. Through a slow process of recognition, training and implementation of
reinvestments in pump maintenance the company went through a "worse-before-better" cycle
and after two years enjoyed impressive turnaround in plant uptime and reduced costs.
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As with Du Pont's 'network' of pumps, the issue of short term investments vs. mid term or
long term investments has a substantial effect on IT infrastructures and network
environments. As with other industries, one can choose to work harder or smarter. The IT
environment and team is constantly driven to generate results faster and that sometimes hurts
the ability to build long term capabilities and remove latent issues. In the context of the thesis,
this pattern is considered as an important contributor to the creation of latent conditions.
Latent conditions in complex systems
The subject of latent conditions is discussed in a number of papers. Reason devotes a chapter
in his book (Reason, 1990) on that issue. Reason speculates that the more complex and
automated a system becomes the more likely latent conditions to occur in the system. The
reason is that as a system has more layers of protection and redundancy built in to it, people
that make mistakes are left without indication for the mistake, as the system keeps on working,
and the problem is more likely to remain undetected. Reason provides a number of data points
indicating that latent conditions can remain in the system for a very long time - months and
even years. In many cases the problem is discovered as a result of the system getting into a
failure mode, after a number of redundancy layers failed. Examples are presented from the
Three Mile Island (1977, nuclear, USA), Bhopal (chemical, India), Chernobyl (nuclear, Russia)
and the capsizing of "Herald of Free Enterprise" (1987, shipping, Belgium).
Human behavior as a contributor to latent conditions
In 1990, James Reason published a book "Human Error" (Reason, 1990), focusing on
accidents and safety issues that manifest themselves in modem technology environments,
resulting from human errors. The book spans a number of themes, psychological research of
human error to accidents investigations.
The author presents a short history of the research done on human error and the motivation
behind it. The main thesis of the book is that human error manifests itself in a limited number
of ways, and these ways are closely related to the cognitive mechanisms that are in charge of
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storing knowledge structures and retrieving them in response to situational demand. The
author discusses variable errors and constant errors and presents the concept of predictable
errors. One goal of the field is to be able to predict under which conditions errors are more
probable. The prediction of errors takes a probabilistic form (during January, some percentage
of people will make mistakes writing checks). Next, the relationship between error and
intention is discussed to show that the concept of error must be related to the intention. The
author presents a framework of three types of errors based on questions about what the
intention was, what executed steps were taken and did they achieve the goal. Using these
question, errors are categorized to "mistakes" that are due to an incorrect intention, and slips
or lapses that relate to correct intention but incorrect execution. A slip is an unintended action
while a lapse is related to incorrect store or retrieve of planned actions. The author states that
mistakes by nature are much more dangerous and may stay undetected for a very long time.
Along these lines the author distinguished three types or errors: planning (mistake), storage
memory (lapse), and execution (slip). The author then distinguishes two forms of errors for an
underspecified problem: "similarity matching" and "frequency gambling". The author covers
different methods of research including collection; questionnaires, laboratory, simulator, and
case studies. No single method is considered the best practice for human error research.
Next, the book covers the theoretical background and presents a framework for human error.
A distinction of two control modes is presented - conscious and unconscious, and two
memory areas are mapped to these modes - working memory and knowledge base. The
attentional control mode is closely identified with the consciousness and working memory, and
is sequential, slow and difficult to sustain for more than a short period of time. This mode uses
'attentional resources' and is in charge of setting future goals, means to achieve them
monitoring and error correction. The schematic mode manages on the background a number
of processes of regularities detection with different aspects of the world. This mode is very
fast, parallel and triggered by certain conditions (activators). It is assumed that the schemata
processes may work based on activation that is not only from the conscious area and that is
how coherent actions and information is available in an unintended way. Specific activators
can be used in an intentional way but use for an extended period of time, moments of
preoccupation or distraction would be a very common cause of slips. General activators
happen in the background and would be activated by context like a familiar environment.
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Some error forms related to the system defaulting to the highly frequent schemata that is
deemed the most suitable for a familiar situation (even if it is not the most suitable).
The book presents a generic error modeling system and error types are further categorized into
skill based slips and lapses, rule based mistakes and knowledge based mistakes. The skill based
mistakes are related to lack of attention or over-attention that leads to missing an input or
misjudging the location in a sequence of actions and then taking actions based on "frequency
gambling". Rule based mistakes are related to misapplication of good rules or application of
bad rules to a situation.
Reason attempts to take the conceptual models presented so far and focus on the question
"what type of machine would operate correctly most of the time but can produce occasional
wrong responses, similar to human behavior". The book presents a computer model that uses
the principles presented so far for a very limited experiment testing knowledge about
presidents of the US. The computer model allows finding information in an unintentional way
that is heavily affected by the frequency of exposure to the data with a level of randomness
when coming to decisions that are underspecified. The results of the model presented good
correlation with human subjects' performance participating in the same experiment along a
number of measurements.
Following the presentation of human error theory and modeling, the book discusses latent
errors and system disasters. The author states that in many cases, the actual operator accident
trigger is just the final touch in a series of mistakes that were done before, by high level
decision makers, construction workers, managers and maintenance people. The author also
present the irony embedded in very complex nearly automated systems, where the operator is
trained and becomes experienced with monitoring, but one of his implicit (and very important)
functions is to deal with whatever the designers could not predict and thus inherently are
complex situations and requires extremely high level of training, experience and in depth
familiarity of the system, that the operator does not have. This opinion is reinforced with
examples from the timeline details of accidents in the nuclear industry. The nature of latent
error is described to be potentially more dangerous than other errors, and the can stay latent in
the system for years without detection. Next, latent errors that originate from insufficient
maintenance are discussed. As any organization is in a constant conflict between short term
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
© 2007 Gadi Oren
Related work - Literature review
goals, like increasing production, capabilities and mid to long term goals, like improving safety,
it is often seen that management chooses the short term goals over the long term ones. The
nature of the maintenance related feedback is very long and it is hard to connect between
cause and effect. The chapter is summarized by stating that "most root causes of serious
accidents in complex technologies are present in the system long before the event".
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Mapping the Risks
In order to measure the risk, a careful definition of what the undesirable end states are is
needed. Within the IT infrastructure world there may be a very large set of undesirable
conditions. In the context of this thesis, the undesirable conditions are defined as a set of
conditions that prevent a company from engaging in a certain activity (whether internal or
external) and complete this activity within a predefined amount of time. Furthermore, it is
assumed for this thesis that the immediate loss of revenue incurred because of the incomplete
operation is tangible and can be quantified (if not, it may not be an important part of the
business, and maybe risk analysis is not required). This type of undesirable condition will be
defined here as Interruption of Service.
For example, if the web site of an on-line retailer can not process credit card transactions, the
loss of revenue can be estimated. If the web site generates on average revenue from sales of
$240,000 per day, a simple estimate may be to determine that one hour of service interruption
translates into $10,000 loss of revenue to the organization (many financial models can be used
here. Financial estimation models are outside of the scope of this thesis). However, if the web
site is working but it is slow, there may be a loss of revenue but it may be hard to estimate
what that loss is, especially since it may be more indirect than direct, such as lower customer
satisfaction that cause customers to buy less over a long period of time. Another example -
consider a Telecom Operator that provides 100,000 minutes of conversation from Boston to
Moscow per hour with a margin of 3 cent per minute. If for some reason the Boston to
Moscow channel should fail, the direct implications would be a loss of $3000 per every hour of
service interruption (for Telecom related information see also Wallin and Leijon, 2006).
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Building Blocks
Assumptions:
a. Software: The majority of elements in the IT domain involve software. Even elements
that would be considered traditionally to be in the hardware category depend heavily
on software. An example would be a network switch that is purchased and installed as
a hardware device but is driven internally by software. It is outside the scope of this
thesis to analyze software reliability. For the purpose of this work, it is assumed that
software provides some functional service that works well if configured correctly and
has all the required resources at its disposal.
b. Granularity: Each of the elements that are discussed in this risk model can be further
decomposed. With each additional level of decomposition, the risk model may be
more complete (although not always). In order to decide what level of decomposition
is sufficient, the following rule of thumb is used: the decomposition is done to the
level of modules that are replaceable or relevant to risk management by an IT user.
This includes any equipment enclosure or sub assembly that can be replaced on site by
the local staff such as power supplies, fans, internal cards or other sub assemblies. If a
manufacturer does not expect local staff to disassemble further a certain component, it
is assumed to fail as a whole and no additional decomposition is needed for modeling
it (for example a hard drive may be decomposed but IT users would replace it as a
unit). If there is a high level architecture difference between systems or devices that are
presented as an advantage, it is a good idea to include that difference in the
decomposition. A simple example would be a device architecture that has less power
supplies than another device. Manufacturers may sell them in two categories: 'Normal'
and 'High Availability', and the latter would include two power supplies. This device
would provide a different risk profile, and be priced differently. Another example is a
service that can provide credit card clearance and relay on more than one digital
clearing house as a way to increase availability and robustness. Modeling these
differences would allow the methodology suggested in this thesis to quantify these
architectural advantages, to show the cost vs. the economic benefit of such differences.
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c. No circular dependency: The failure mode of an element Ex may depend on other
elements Ea-Eb, and they may depend on other elements, etc. The dependency tree
that is spanned from Ex does not contain Ex at any depth of the tree, for any Ex that
belongs to the infrastructure.
The following are elements that are used as a part of the model:
1. Service: A service is the ability to perform something that creates value within a given
time frame. A service may depend on one or more other services and a number of
servers. A service may also depend on a set of logical and physical resources accessible
over communication networks. For example, a payroll is a business process that may
involve for company ACME, checking the amount of hours done by a contractor
during the last week, checking his contract, finding the contractor's hourly rate and
home address and sending the check. In that example, the payroll business process can
be defined as a service that depends on three other services: a. the hourly registration
system, the contract management system and personnel files. If any of the three
services is not working, it is possible that the payroll business process can not be
performed, and that there is an interruption of service.
2. Server: A server is an enclosure that contains a set of resources and communication
capabilities. A server may be used as a part of a service. A server depends on external
power supply(s) in order to function. A server may have subcomponents that are
redundant with the intention of risk reduction.
3. Network switch: A network switch is an enclosure that allows communication (usually
broken into pieces of a limited size known as "data packets") to traverse the network.
A switch depends on external power supply(s) in order to function. A switch may
support logical entities that are required for certain communication routes to exist.
4. Network connections: A cable that allows a communication to exist.
5. Network Attached Resource: A resource that is available over the network. An
example for such a resource would be a file that is hosted on a remote file system.
Network Attached Resource depends on Resource Physical Components.
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6. Resource Physical Components: Physical elements that comprise a Network Attached
Resource.
7. Logical configurations. There are many types of logical configurations (depending on
the type on network) that may enable or disable the usage of a Network Attached
Resource by a Server or by a Service. For the scope of this thesis a simple subset of the
logical elements was chosen:
a. Resource and Server allow group: This is a logical group that allows a certain
Server to access a certain resource. For example, a file on a remote file-system
that is marked to be accessible by a certain Server.
b. Port exposure group: This is a logical group that lists a set of resource
enclosure ports that allow access to network attached resources. This group is
set specifically per every network attached resource.
Redundancy Types
There are several types of redundancy used in IT systems:
1. Physical: This type of redundancy is the most straightforward redundancy. For
example, a service may depend on one Server or two Servers. Assuming a dependency
model of one out of N, it is clear that having two servers is preferred in terms of
redundancy.
2. Logical configuration: This is a situation where there are different logical
configurations that allow a certain Service or a part of a Service to function. Example -
let's assume that in the US air traffic system, there are flights that land in Providence
coming only from New York or from Boston. In that imaginary system, there is a
redundancy level of two with regards to possible ways to get to Providence. If one day,
the Boston authorities would decide that it is no longer possible for planes taking off
from (or going through) Boston to land in Providence, the system redundancy would
be reduced to one, even though there is no physical issue, and nothing in the system is
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'broken'. The question "Is there any component of the system that is broken?" is likely
to be answered with a "no". From a system level view, flights keep on landing in
Providence and the system is working. In this example, the logical configuration of the
system is the arbitrary decision to rule out a certain flight route. This is very similar to
possible logical configurations that can be used in networking infrastructures.
3. Temporal: A situation where there is redundancy that is an exact replication of a
resource that is done at a certain interval T. At t=0 the resource is replicated, while at
0<t<T the resource is not exactly identical. An example for this type of redundancy is
a backup. If a piece of data (the resource) is replicated into another location every
hour, than every hour we have full information redundancy. However as the time
progresses between 1min until 59min the quality of the replication is (potentially)
declining. An example for 'lower quality': If a problem occurs in the original copy after
50 min, all the changes that took place over that period of time are lost. If that data
reflects for example, information on ships that left Boston harbor, that loss of quality
may be acceptable, but on the other hand if the lost data represents information on
planes that took off from Logan airport, this loss or quality may not be acceptable.
Understanding the Risk
Most large companies would have an IT strategy. This strategy is comprised of a set of
capabilities that the company would like to develop and use to better compete in the
marketplace. In order to execute the strategy, a set of services is being developed and
implemented in the IT system. Each one of these services may be of very different value to
different people in the organization. For example, an HR system may be important to the HR
personnel and an interruption of service in this system for a single day may cause some
damage but this damage is hard to measure monetarily. However, other services may lead to
higher and more tangible value. These tend to be the outbound services. For example, a web
site failing with a large on-line retailer can be quantified very easily: If today is similar to
yesterday (both are mid week, and no holiday days), and yesterday the web site generated a
revenue of $10,000 between 12:00 and 1:00PM, a simple estimation model would be to assume
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that an hour of downtime today (around the same time) will lead to a loss of $10,000.
Obviously, much more accurate and complex estimation models can developed based on the
available data and statistics. Another example would be an airline ticketing service system. The
failure of such a service for a single hour may lead to a very high loss of revenue, and again this
cost can be estimated by the airline company.
Another aspect of the risk is probability. Based on the failure profile of all the physical
elements that comprise a service (a service depends indirectly on a large number of physical
elements), there is a probability P(t) that there is going to be an interruption of service for a
certain service between time 0 and time t. If the IT system does not change, P(t) will be
increasing as t increases. P(t=infinity) = 1 because after a long time it is certain to have an
interruption of service. However, the function P(t) may itself change over time. For example, if
there is a redundant resource that has failed, an interruption of service is likely and P(t) would
reflect that. However, if a maintenance person fixed the broken resource, P'(t) will replace P(t)
and will show lower probability for a failure. The opposite may happen if a resource got
broken at some point. P"(t) may reflect a higher probability for a failure or may actually be 1, if
the broken resource actually caused an interruption in service.
For a given set of services:
{S,,S 2,S3 ,...,IS7 }
There is a matching set of failure probabilities:
{4l(0t),2(0t),3(t),... ,g (t)}
And a set of monetary estimation of price of interruption of service:
{ V, I , V3 ... I V }
The exposure (the expected loss) of the organization from time t=O until t=T is the expected
"price" to pay for all possible interruptions of service during that time:
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n
e(t) = (t)
i=1
Assuming that e(t) can be found, an organization can choose a number of methodologies to
reduce or bound the value of e(t).
In order to try and find e(t), two methods were considered.
1. PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment
2. A combination of Cellular Automata and Monte Carlo method
It should be noted that the first method was found difficult to implement for this type of
problem. The next chapter documents the work that was done, and can be skipped if the
reader is more interested in the chosen methodology only.
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Risk Analysis Using PRA
In Figure 1, we can see a network diagram that represents a simple service:
Card 2
AI I
I SC
.)" °
Figure 1 - A Simple service accessing a network resource
The service depends on a single server - Server 72. For redundancy purposes, Server 72 can
access the network through two network cards. Each one of the cards can access through a
separate set of switches, a number of logical resources. It is important to note that each card
gets access to the information through a physically different array of network switches.
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Eventually through both cards, Server 72 can access three network attached resources (99, 100
and 125). The dependency model here is that all resources are needed for the service to
operate. In reality, the same network resources may be used by other services:
Figure 2 - Two services sharing network infrastructure
As can be seen in Figure 2, service 1 and service 2 are both using the same switches to access
different network attached resources.
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Dealing with logical configurations: Logical configurations are an overlay on the physical
configuration. In the most complex case, the logical configuration may allow or deny the flow
of information based on the specific path that the information passed through. As this
information is not captured in graph flow algorithms, a modification of the suggested method
would have to be developed. Two options are possible. One is to 'color' information based on
its path. Another approach would be to replicate the entire graph per each one of the logical
configurations. Both approaches are challenging.
Dealing with physical dependency: Whenever a physical dependency exists we will change the
graph to reflect this dependency. For example, lets assume that all the logical network-attached
resources depend on a physical replicated resource (such as in the case of a redundant file
system). Since all the logical network-attached resources are required, they will be organized
serially, but their internal structure will be organized in parallel to express the redundancy:
Figure 3 - Logical resources and physical resources presented as a
graph
A failure of the service depends on a failure of (D1 and D2) or (D3 and D4) or (D5 and D6).
Another example would be to express the dependency of network elements in power supplies
and power grids (or generators):
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Extemal electricity
SInternal Power supplies
External Connecfions
Figure 4 - Internal structure expressed as a graph
Although the actual data does not flow through the grid and power supply, their proper
operation (or a subset of them) enables that flow. In a similar way, other elements can be
introduced, such as geographical location (see Common-Cause Failures). This may be very
important to judge the robustness of a system as was proven in many physical disasters and
terrorist attacks where redundant network elements should be place in separate geographical
location.
Minimal Cut Set
After constructing a graph that represents both the flow and the dependencies, the following
algorithm is suggested in order to find the minimal cut-sets.
Procedure: MinimalCutset(SD)
1. R=0;
2. Let S be the source and D be the drain.
3. C = {P1,,P2 ,...P} Ix e C, connected(S,x)
4. What is size(C) ?
o size(C) = 1: R=R+S, S=first(C)
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o size(C) >1: B=FirstMutualPoint(S,D); R =R + H MinimalCutset(x, B); S=B
XEC
o size(C) = 0: Stop 4) result is R
5. Goto3
Procedure: FirstMutualPoint(S,D)
1. C = {,,,...J }I x e C, connected(x,S)
2. Gx = Q,,Q2,Q3,..., QII Q, = P,P EC, Q, = D,0< y<_n---+connected(Qy_,,Q,)
3. All mutual points between branches: Gm = fG x
xX
4. Stop 4-) result is first(Gm)
For example, observe the following network connection from a source a to the drain p:
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Figure 5 -An example network for minimal cut-set algorithm
1. R=0
2. C={b}
3. size(C)= 1
a. R=a; S=b
4. C= {c,d}
5. size(C)>l: B=FirstMutualPoint(b,p)=j;R=a+b+(d+f)*(c+e+(g)*(h+i))+j; S=j
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6. C= {k}
7. size(C)>1:B=FirstMutualPoint(j,p)=o;R=a+b+(d+f)*(c+e+(g)*(h+i))+j
+(k+m)*(l+n)+o; S=o
8. C={p}
9. size(C)=1: R= a+b+(d+f)*(c+e+(g)*(h+i))+j +(k+m)*(l+n)+o+p
R= a+b+(d+f)*(c+e+(g)*(h+i))+j +(k+m)*(l+n)+o+p
R=a+b+(d+f)*(c+e+gh+gi)+j+(kl+kn+ml+mn)+o+p
R=a+b+dc+de+dgh+dgi+fc+fe+fgh+fgi+j+kl+kn+ml+mn+o+p
Other algorithms were suggested for this issue (Jain and Gopal, 1988). The suggested
algorithm is more suitable to the specific problem because it incorporates a hybrid model that
allows both the pure network aspect as well as the internal and external structure to be taken
into account.
Model Limitations
This proposed model, using PRA and network graph theory contains a number of limitations:
1. Some of the elements in the model are based on software. Currently there is no simple
way of finding the reliability of software.
2. The model assumes that there is no circular dependency. This assumption may not be
always true as IT systems may end up with circular dependencies.
3. The general problem of network reliability using cut-sets suffers from the following
issues:
a. The issue may be so computationally intense that the benefit may not justify
the cost. See (Ball, 1979).
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b. After a calculation of a very complex cut-set with many parts, the accumulated
numeric error may render the result unusable.
4. The above model is not generic enough to deal with certain types of network logical
configurations.
Given the limitations, other directions were explored in order to compare with this approach.
The next chapter presents an alternative approach to PRA.
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Risk Analysis using CA and MC
Using PRA to assess reliability and availability leads to an NP-hard problem (Ball, 1979). In the
article "A combination of Monte Carlo simulation and cellular automata for computing the
availability of complex network systems" (Zio et al, 2006), the authors suggest a different
method to assess reliability and availability of networks (see also literature review). The
suggested method is a good base to address the problem but requires some enhancements for
a number of reasons:
1. The suggested method is good for one source to one destination, whereas network
services use multiple sources to multiple destinations connection model.
2. The authors used a limited set of possible failures (arcs and nodes). In a more realistic
scenario, nodes and arcs may be influenced by internal structure and exogenous
conditions (e.g. power, cooling, weather disasters, common cause failures and others).
In order to allow assessing the risk as it is effected by the technical management of the
infrastructure, it is necessary to represent other structures that the technical
management can make a decision on (will I buy a device with one internal power
supply or redundant?). This will create a hybrid model of CA and a set of dependencies
that may change its activity state.
3. The paper assumes that the system is not changing over time. This assumption is not
sufficient for the problem that this thesis is trying to address, which include a high
amount of changes to the network (see also Wallin and Leijon, 2006 on changes in
Telecom networks).
4. The suggested method is very hardware driven. However, a large number of issues can
be caused by network logical configuration changes and human errors related to these
configurations.
5. The model assumes a stochastic constant fix profile for failed elements. This
assumption is not sufficient. One of the claims of this thesis is that elements will be
fixed based on their impact to the business.
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6. The suggested importance measurements may apply well to a hardware driven model
but are limited when the cause to failure may be also logical configuration changes.
7. The suggested importance measurements do not present the importance based on the
impact to the business. The importance should be presented from a service point of
view.
A simulation package was developed to enhance the method suggested by Zio et al, using MC
(Robert and Casella, 2004) and specific PRNG (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998). The
following section describes the enhancements done to the suggested method in order to
address the above points.
Multjle Sources to Multple Destinations
In order to allow the same CA infrastructure to address multiple sources to multiple
destinations, the individual Automaton had to be enhanced. Each of the new Automaton can
be viewed as having intemrnal multiple automatons. Here is an example of multiple flows:
c
C
g
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m n o
Figure 6 - CA Steps from two sources to three destinations
In Figure 6, we can see a multiple source to multiple target CA flow example. Following the
connection from b, the first step (1) (right hand side) d and f are activated. The next step (2) c
and h are activated because d is active, and j is activated because f is active. In the next step (3)
g is activated because of c, 1 is activated because of h and i because of j. In the final step (4), e
and k are activated because of i, and m, n, o are activated because of 1. In general, there can be
any number of sources and any number of destinations.
A hybrid model
In order to allow assessing decisions of infrastructure management and architecture, one level
of decomposition into some of the elements is required, as well as some exogenous inputs.
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Figure 7 - A typical fault tree for a network element
Figure 7 presents a typical fault tree of a high-availability network element. The element may
be very simple, for example a single CA, or a more complex like in the case of a server that has
two network cards. In that case, as each network card has its individual stochastic failure
characteristics, a number of CAs would represent the server network element.
A service is an abstraction of a business process performed by the organization. As such, it can
depend on network elements (for example, a number of servers running an application), other
services, or both. Figure 8 describes a service that depends on at least two network elements to
perform as well as an additional service (that may also depend on other elements)
Figure 8 - Service fault tree
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Changes over time
Changes can originate from a number of sources such as a failure event, a physical change
event (network operator is changing the network topology) or a logical configuration change,
but all changes are treated in a uniform way. First the fault trees are realized to determine, next
changes to the topology or logical configuration are applied locally and affect a subset of the
CA nodes. Finally the change propagates through the network and may change the system's
state.
m n o m n
m n o
Figure 9 - Change propagation
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Figure 9 presents a change causing node d to stop to working (0). Next, the node is no longer
passing information (1). Later the effects are propagating to nodes c and h (2). Note that node
c is only partially effected because of the connection to node a. Finally, node g is affected by
node c (3), and the propagation stops. In that case, as a result of redundancy in the system,
failure of node d did not change the ability of information to flow from sources a and b to
destinations m, n and o. Calculating changes by propagation is computationally more efficient
than calculating the entire state of the system (Zio et al, 2006).
Network Logical Configuration
As network is by its nature a shared resource, almost any practical implementation of
computer networks contains logical configuration that aim to determine who can access what
resources. The reasons for such mechanisms include security, scalability and efficiency. When
any type of network resource is being accessed (by sending information from a source to a
destination) it is important to know how is the source in order to accept or deny
communication. An example to such a logical configuration was given earlier in the text,
around a decision of airport authorities to accept plans coming from a certain airport or from a
certain source. This is a policy than affect the behavior of the system although no physical
element in the system changed (or broke).
There are many types of logical configurations, depending on the type of network and the type
of communication protocol used. For the purpose of the thesis two relatively generic
mechanisms where chosen. It is relatively simple to change or add new mechanisms to match a
specific type of network. One of the mechanisms is "allow list": Each destination has a list of
sources that it is allowed to get information from. This mechanism is equivalent of an airport
authorities stating that flights originating from place X can not land in the airport. The second
mechanism is "exposure list": Each resource can be exposed to the network through a number
of entry points. While all entry point may be cabled into the network, the resource will
selectively accept communication coming through certain entry points. This is equivalent of
stating that only flight going through London can land in Boston airport and only flights going
through Paris or Frankfurt can land in New York. This kind of configuration allows funneling
all international flights into two groups - the one going to Boston (and thus must go through
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London) and the ones going to New York (and must go through Paris or Frankfurt). By
setting this configuration (and assuming that there are flights possible both to New York and
Boston), the 'designer' of the system ensured redundancy with regards to flying into the US,
and balances the loads through the incoming airports (London, Paris and Frankfurt). Without
that definition, if all airlines chose to fly through London, apart from being highly overloaded,
the London airport might have become a single point of failure.
Human Error and Equipment Failure
The study of human mistakes and errors is of high importance. With certain industries the
stakes are very high and in many cases measured in lives. For example, in chemical and nuclear
industries many accidents that caused loss of lives and injuries were investigated showing a
wide range of human errors (Reason, 1990). As a result of very tangible human losses these
industries developed high degree of awareness to human errors and a large amount of data on
errors was collected. In the IT infrastructure and network management the stakes are different
(more economic than safety oriented) and very little information can be found. In his book,
Human Enror, Reason makes the distinction between operators, designers, different levels of
management and maintenance personnel (Reason, 1990, p 173) as different contributors of
errors and eventually to an accident. It is interesting to note that in the networking
management domain, a network engineer may play more than one of these roles. For example,
the operator maintenance person and the designer of the network are almost the same person.
Changing the network logical configuration is in many ways changing its design. Reason also
claims that creating more technologically complex systems with internal protections and
redundancy levels prevents people from revealing their mistakes immediately (Reason, 1990, p
179). Case studies also shows that latent errors in complex systems may remain undiscovered
for long periods of time, sometimes years (Reason, 1990, p 189) and that issues left behind for
a long period of time increase drastically the probability of a coincidence of multiple faults (p
180). This type of pattern is also true for IT infrastructures. The teams that manage the
networks are getting smaller and they manage larger infrastructures (Wallin and Leijon, 2006).
Under these conditions, any available resource is directed at "production capabilities" that is
generating tangible revenue in the short term and not investing time on maintenance issues
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that are of mid-long term nature. This reinforces the information available from other
industries, that latent issues would remain undiscovered.
Using this information, human error was defined as follows: The daily changes that are applied
to IT infrastructure aim to add or remove a connection between a source and a destination.
Assuming that the change was implemented successfully, all previous connections should work
the as before, with an additional connection operational. Errors of the type lapse or slip would
manifest themselves as a missing or incorrect action. As mistakes are more diverse, more
potent and can take a very wide range of forms, the thesis does not try to model them (this will
make an interesting direction for further research). Also, in order to allow simulation, an
amount of tasks per week is assumed, and instead of actually changing the network, the change
is assumed to be one that ends up with the infrastructure in the same state as before
(eventually changing nothing) with one difference - in the process, the operator can have a
lapse or a slip, that would appear as an incorrect configuration. It is assumed that a person
would make a mistake with a constant of H. If such an error has no effect on any of the
services, it would remain latent. However, if a service fails as a result of the error, every
possible reason for that failure (both the immediate cause and latent causes) is fixed within a
given amount of time. The time to discover, and time to fix (both stochastic) are attributes of a
service and per instance, the numbers that are used depend on the effected service.
Hardware failures are determined per component type to have different MTBF coefficients.
The case study presented later in the text includes a set of coefficients that are typical for the
hardware class. In general, it is very typical for equipment MTBF to be very long (tens of
years). The combination of rare hardware fail events, the large amount of changes to the
infrastructure and human errors, creates causal chains that lead to failures. Both hardware
failures and human errors would eventually be found and fixed after a long time. For hardware
this time is MTTFixc and for human errors MTTFiXH*.
This type of modeling also give rise to examining interesting questions like: What is the effect
of replacing a network element with certain MTBFc, with another component with MTBFc2?
What is the effect of replacing an element with a certain internal structure with a newer model
with a better design? What is the implication of changing the mistake rate of the team (by
training or getting people with a higher skill set)?
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Importance Measures
While the traditional importance measures: F-(t) = F(t o, () =l, re [0,t]), and
Fc+ (t) = F(t wc (r) = 0, re [0,t]) are common and are used as a base for other measures
such as Risk achievement worth, Risk reduction worth, Fussell-Vesely measure and Birnbaum
measure, they have two issues: a. they do not related well to logical configuration change (there
is no meaning to attempt and make a logical configuration change 'more robust' to avoid a
failure), and b. they do not reflect the importance of the component of configuration in terms
of business impact. Furthermore it can be argued that there is no single measure, as different
stakeholders may have a different subset of business services that are interesting for them. This
thesis suggests another importance measure. Every time a component fail-event or a logical
configuration change-event takes place, and it is a cause for a service failure (either immediate
or latent), it is assigned with a weight to reflect its contribution to the failure (for example, if
two redundant power supplies failed inside an element, each one would have 50%
contribution) and with the amount of actual loss created by the failure of this services. Later, a
weighted average of expected loss related to the specific event (and a subset of available
services) can be generated to reflect the expected business impact.
There are a finite number of possible events. For each failure the contribution of each event is
defined as follows:
Let E be a set of all possible events,
timeline(t) = {e, , e2, . . , eq } , e, e E - oredered set with possible repeats
Va, ea e timeline(t), let time(a, t) be defined as the time of ea in timeline t
Va, bI ea e timeline(t), e E timeline(t),b > a => time(b, t) > time(a, t)
let i: i e {l..N}, event number, e e timeline(t)
let S be set of all services
let j: j e {1..M}, service number, s1 eS
Cll I -.. Cim
Ci, j = . . , Vj e {I..M} - > ci = 1
LCn nm i=.,N
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For each service, the fixed cost of repair and the variable cost of repair are defined as:
j e {L..M} - service number
rf, 1V
rf2  2RF.= ~R V.= j
-fm m
Units of: rf - Currency
Currency
Units of: rv - Currency
Hour
The fixed cost and the variable cost are defined in order to allow different types of cases. Some
service interruptions may be very simple to fix (for example replacing a cable) and thus not
expensive in terms of fixed cost. At the same time, these interruptions may be extremely
expensive for each hour passing. Other types of interruptions may be very expensive to fix
(replacing an expensive part) while their variable cost is low.
Given an interruption of service of h hours, the impact can be found as follows:
let te {l..T} - timeline number
let A(t) - number of service interruptions in timeline t
a E {1..A(t)} - service interruption number
C(a,t) - contribution matrix for a specific failure a in timeline t
IM (a,t)=C(a,t). RF+C(a,t). RV. h =
CL,1 C1,2  .' C1,m rf C1, 1  C1, 2  , ,m r
1M2 () = C2l ,2  r f 2 C2,1 C2,2 I Lih
Cn,1 Cn'm m _ Cn,1 Cn,m _ _ m
c, -rf +c1,2 +**+Cm rfm +1,1 * +1,2 *1 + 1,+Clm rvm)h1
IM (a, t) =
Cen,1 rf1 Cn,2 . rf " C nm rfm - cn,1 - + C,2 .-++C nm .rvm) .h
Finding the importance measures is defined as follows:
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A(t) - The number of failures in timeline t
T A(t) imI
IM, =- : -  IM i ( a , t ) =TI1 =1 a=1
immj
If only a subset of the services is of interest, we can define a new contribution matrix:
i {1 ..N} - event number
j {1L..M} - service number
Sik = Is ... smVkE l.M},sk S>Sk = 1, service k is of interest
sk = 0, service k is of no interest
Cs = Si. C
IMSj =Cs.RF+Cs.RV.h
I T A(t) im1
IMSJ = - Z IMSj (a,t) =
t=1 a=1 imSm J
IMm
The importance measures:
F-(t)=F(t Io (r)= l,v Ie[0,t]), and F'(t)=F(t oI (r) =0,r e [0,t]) are not found in
the process described above. In their paper (Zio et al, 2006), Zio et al discusses that for some
cases certain measurements can be difficult to estimate because of a low amount of data
points. This is true in the context of this thesis with regards to F- (t) and F+ (t). However, if
required, these values can be found specifically by creating a dedicated set of simulations for
each event. However, considering that this can be done for each of the possible events, finding
these measures for all events may require substantial time and computing resources.
Checking CA and MC vs. PRA
In their paper (Zio et al, 2006), the authors perform a simple test to validate that their new
model works as expected and produces similar results to PRA for a small test case. After
implementing and enhancing the model as described above, a similar test was performed. As
the extension of the model included fault trees, the example that was chosen is a case of two
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fans supporting a network element. Each fan has mean time between failure (MTBF) of 13
years. The PRA expression of the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is:
-P(,t 2)
P ( F,, F2) I--
MC and PRA comparison for two fans failure pattern
Iterations: 5000, RMSE=0.34%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
.: 50%
0.
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-"4 0T 8 0 -Days
-.2 (0 M) 01) W~ Cn W 0 -4) 0)():i(: - )0 CA) 0z -. j ,
Days
- Simulated
--- PRA
Figure 10 - MC and PRA simple comparison test case
Although the match between PRA results and the simulated results looked promising initially,
the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) found in Figure 10 presented a lower bounded behavior
when increasing the amount of iterations. As this result was unexpected, more tests were
needed to further verify why the average RMSE is bounded. Two more tests were performed:
a. the RMSE over time was expected to be found similar to a random walk; b. the relationship
between RMSE and the number of iterations was checked. When testing the RMSE over time
the initial results were as follows:
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Figure 11 - RMSE over time for an incorrect implementation
The RMSE distribution described in Figure 11 was again highly counter intuitive. In a close
observation, the model was found to generate time related rounding errors during the
mathematical simulation process. This error was exposed as a result of a large number of
iterations error accumulations. Once the rounding errors were addressed, the following results
were found:
Error ecumulated Itr=10000
- Seriesl
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
© 2007 Gadi Oren
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
00 0.25
0.2E
0.15
,• 0.1
0.05
0
-0.05
0.006
0.004
0 002._0
0 o
-0.002
-0 004
-0,006
-0.008
03 - • r•
~~=fS~~4
Risk Model
days
Figure 12 - RMSE over time for a correct implementation
As originally expected, the results in Figure 12 presented the qualities of a random walk. This
test was performed many times and inspected visually to ensure that there are no noticeable
patterns or artifacts. The two results in Figure 12 are a subset of these tests.
Next, the relationship between iterations and error was tested:
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Figure 13 - RMSE as a function of MC iterations
Figure 13 shows a relationship between the number of iterations and the error. Each vertical
batch of points represents 10 runs with the specific number of iterations. The iterations
numbers started at 10 and moved up at x2 increments to 80192.
Cost Benefit Analysis
As described above in the importance measures section, the having the service(s) participate in
the risk model allows estimating what is the monetary value of each component and
configuration. As a part of the simulation, it also allows simulation of losses per each timeline.
The accumulated losses have the behavior of a random walk that is bounded by the X axis, by
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definition. Averaging the accumulated losses at a point in time would provide the expected loss
at that point in time for a given configuration. The set of simulated losses at a point in time
also allow understanding what the probability density function of losses is at that time. Both
these finding are presented later as a part of the case study results.
The ability to simulate future losses at a given future time, for different architectures, enables
performing a cost benefit analysis. For example, if an equipment vendor has a new type of
network element with superior attributes such as better internal redundancy or better MBTF
profile, and the price of replacing is X, is it a good idea to replace a subset of network elements
to the new model? Which subset would be optimal? A different example: if a network has a
failure that is not effecting any of the services (a loss of redundancy layer), and the cost of
fixing is Y, should it be fixed?
In order to answer these types of questions, the benefit should be estimated. Assuming a
comparison between two architectures, Al and A2:
Let L, (t) be the losses of Al at future time t, and L2 (t) losses of A2 at future time t. Both
are random variables with unknown distributions.
S(t) DAI (t)
L2 (t) -DA 2(t)
The ROI period should be determined. While is some industries that may be years, in IT it is
not unheard of to look for an ROI of less than a year. In these conditions NPV may not even
be required. However, if an NPV is required, the discount rate should be provided. Let c be the
cost of moving from Al to A2. The benefit b can be expressed as follows:
b = NPV(L 2(t)-L,(t))-c
Correlation: As b is a function of random variables, b is also a random variable. A very
important point to determine is the correlation of L1, L2, the two loss random variables.
Correlation coefficient is defined as:
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A 2= E ((L4 -,u ) (L2 -p 12 )
The importance of determining the correlation is that if the two have some correlation, there
will be an effect on the distribution of b, and as a result an effect on the confidence factors of
profit and loss levels. Furthermore, since the distributions of Li, L12 are unknown, it is
reasonable to use empirical result data, construct the distributions and then find b using MC.
However, using a simulation without understanding the relationship between the random
variables may lead to incorrect results.
The two loss random variables Li and L2 may be related because of the following reasons. If
the architectures A 1 and A2 are very close, one could argue that all the equipment is the same
(or almost the same) in both architectures. When projecting into the future, arguably, the same
equipment failures would happen in a timeline of the first architecture as well as the second. In
other words - the failures are 'pre-destined' to happen in both timelines.
However, some failures are a result of operating conditions. While the concept that failures are
'pre-destined' to happen in both timeline in the same way may be true for projections to the
near future, after longer periods of time the failure causes will start diverging. Also, the main
contributor to failures is people changing the infrastructure (intentionally or not), not
equipment failure (see - literature review). It is hard to say how human error (mistakes, lapses
and slips) will correlate between two timelines. However, with even a very small difference
between architectures A 1 and A2, and human errors depending on the architectures, there will
be slightly different procedures for people to implement. As opposing to equipment that is
'destined' to fail at a certain time, people are likely to make the 'pre-destined' mistakes in
different procedures, leading to very different loss results and therefore likely to diverge
quickly. Finally, let's consider what is the impact of no correlation? The impact would be that
the distribution of b has a larger variance meaning that the benefit bears more uncertainty.
Given the above reasoning, this thesis uses the conservative assumption that L1, L2 are not
correlated.
PA,L,2 =0
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In order to estimate the benefit b, two factors are important: the expected benefit and the
variance. As Ll and L2 are by assumption not correlated, there is a probability of improving
an architecture and ending up with a loss. It is possible to estimate the level of confidence as
follows:
E(b) - expected benefit
n - number of periods
d - discount rate
P(b < 0) = P(NPV(n,d, L2(t) - L (t)) < c) =
P((1 + d)-" (L2 (t) - L1 (t)) < c)=
P((L2(t)- L(t)) < c (I + d))=
f P(12 < x)-P(11 > c(1+d)n-+ x).dx =
X=.=.=0
P(b < 0) = fP (12 =u) -du - P(l, =v) -d.v .x
x=0 U=- v=c(l+d)"+x
Or expressed in words: the probability of a loss is the sum probability of all combinations
where the discounted profit (L2 less L1) is smaller than the cost of making the change from
architecture A to architecture A2.
Epistemic System Model
The model suggested in this thesis is affected by two types of stochastic models. The first is
component failure, and the second is human error. In order to use the model, information has
to be found from component equipment vendors and assumptions should be made about the
nature and profile of human error. However, an organization with a large infrastructure in
place can use these as base assumptions only and adjust them over time. Given enough
equipment, the information on component failure can be collected and fed back into the
component profiles and change them. The advantage of that approach is that information can
be fed back even if there were no failures (Apostolakis, 2006) and (Helton and Burmaster,
1996)
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The risk profile can be adjusted by taking every period of time the results for all components
that are identical, in terms of number of failures.
;(2) is the priory profile (PDF).
L(E 2) is the likelihood function of evidence E to occur given the assumed x(A).
17'(A E) is the posterior profile (PDF) given evidence E.
Then the posterior distribution is given by: /r'(A I E) = L(EI A r()
L(E I 2) -r(2)d2
The same model can be used to assess human error profile. However, care should be taken to
categorize the events well. For components that would mean choosing exactly identical
components model, and for human error, defining similar environmental situations that would
lead to a mistake, slip or lapse. For example, if a certain job requires two operations sequence
vs. another task that requires fifteen actions in an accurate sequence are clearly different in
terms of the potential for a lapse. It is outside the scope of this thesis to examine further how
an epistemic model can be successfully implemented. This can be an interesting subject for
further research.
Common-Cause Failures
Within an IT environment there are many factors that can lead to common cause. One of the
assumptions taken here is that the network elements have a binary failure mode. However, the
majority of devices today used in a networked environment are driven internally be a CPU, a
Microcontroller or a PLA (Programmable Logic Array, such as FPGA from Xilinx). The
software that drives these devices is known as 'firmware'. The firmware is the operating-system
software of the network element and can be updated from time to time as new software
revisions become available. An important common cause is the firmware version. The
tendency of network managers is to upgrade all devices to the latest firmware version, once the
vendor recommends doing so. However, in the rare event of a faulty firmware, the fact that
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many network elements are using the same faulty software version may lead to multiple
failures spanning multiple geographic locations. That situation may render the redundant
infrastructure design to a meaningless effort.
Another source of common causes is physical proximity. As observed in recent natural
disasters and terrorist attacks, an installation such as a data center can become inactive as a
whole. On a smaller scale, an event such as fire or a local flood may lead to failure of a number
of devices (or cables) depending on their physical proximity to the event source.
The exact weight of common cause failure is not known yet, and best practices claim that
about 10% of failures will originate from common cause. However, the common causes that
are known can be added into an enhanced model. For example, if the physical location
coordinates is added for each CA (in that case cables may have to be broken down to a
number of CAs), best estimates for localized or large scale disasters can be modeled. Since the
system failure mode can be very different in a common case situation, as a result of multiple
failures, this type of modeling may be of interest to assess readiness of infrastructure for such
events. It is outside the scope of this thesis to examine further how common causes can be
modeled. This can be an interesting subject for further research.
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CASE STUDY
Description
Figure 14 shows a simple network configuration chosen as a case study:
Figure 14 - Case study base configuration
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The main service HostService represents a business process that uses one physical server.
Every one of the blocks marked with a continuous square line represents a physical entity that
has stochastic failure characteristics (see Case Parameters for the actual chosen numbers). The
wide lines represent cables that allow transmission of network information. The dashed line
square (network resource) represents an abstract entity that is provided to users. The network
resource is composed of Resource Elements that are a physical entity.
The case contains two services marked with a rounded square line: HostService, which
represents a business process that is using the server (for example, an application) and
PowerGrids service. The HostService has a price associated with it, while PowerGrids does
not. In contrast to all the endogenous elements that by assumption remain broken until an
interruption of service, the exogenous item such as all types of utilities (specifically grid) are
promptly fixed even if they did not lead to an interruption of service. The sole purpose of
PowerGrids service is to ensure that the model will limit the length of external grid failure to a
limited amount of time.
The intention of the case is to show the impact of a change. There are three changes chosen,
presented in Figure 15, Figure 16 and Figure 17.
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Figure 15 - Case study first change - cable disconnect
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Figure 16 - Case study second change - incorrect server
connection
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Figure 17 - Case study third change - resource enclosure
incorrect connection
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Case Parameters
Note: some of the following parameters were chosen after as a result of information from
vendors on certain type of equipment, while others were assumed.
Table 1 - Case study, component assumptions
SERVER
NET_ADAPTOR
CABLE
SWITCH
LINE_CARD
SOCKET_ADAPTOR
RESOURCE_ENCLOSURE
RESOURCE_ELEMENT
FAN
GRID
POWER_SUPPLY
650
1000
15
14
100
20
45
13
20
10
165U
365
730
180
1095
1095
180
14
1095
1
1095
The Mean Time to Fix, MTTFixc is the time that an element would be fixed even if it
caused no interruption of service. The reason that this number varies across the different
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components is because some hardware components are tooled and monitored. For example
with some network configurations, the 'resource element' may be a disk that can flag incorrect
working conditions. In such situations where a component has failed, it would be discovered
quickly. In other situations such as a failure of a 'line card', that is not tooled to report its
condition, would be discovered after a long time.
The following assumptions were used for services:
Table 2 - Case study, service assumptions
PowerGrids
distribution
K=5
0=1
Gamma
distribution
K=5
0=1
distribution
K=l
0=1
Gamma
distribution
K=l
0=1
0 0
As mentioned earlier, the HostService represents an important business process that has
tangible cost implications to a loss of service. The PowerGrids service was used to represent
the power grid utilities. There is no direct cost associated with a failure of one of the power
grids, although the indirect implications can lead to a failure of other services and indirect cost.
However, it is assumed that utilities are a 'monitored' service and an interruption of a utility
service would be fixed promptly (as opposing to internal issues that would be fixed only if they
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lead to a noticeable service interruption). Gamma distribution was used because of a better
control possible in the distribution shape over lognormal distribution, and the fact that it is
bounded on the low side and unbounded on the high side, a shape that lends itself well to
reactive events (time to find an issue - after the issue started or time to fix a problem - after fix
procedures started).
It was assumed that in the case study network there are ten weekly changes to the network.
Lapses and Slips (Reason, 1990) are assumed to have Mean number of Changes Between
Mistakes (MCBM) of: MCBML=200 for lapses and MCBM s= 200 for slips, with relation to the
amount of changes applied to the infrastructure.
Logical Configuration
The resource enclosure in the case contains three network resources marked V1, V2, and V3.
Each one of the resources contains two types of configurations: Port Exposure list and Allow
List. The port exposure list is a configuration that sets through which resource enclosure ports
it is possible to access the network resource. In Figure 18 it is possible to see how all three
resources allow access through the same two ports (with IDs 30000002 and 40000003) marked
by the dashed lines. This allows having only two cables go into the network while maintaining
redundancy. Obviously, it is possible to use all four available ports to enhance the redundancy
further.
Port ID:Pri
300000023
'---t -------
Figure 18 -Logical Configuration, Exposure List
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Figure 19 - Allow list configuration
Figure 19 shows the logical effect of allow list set for V1. Each one of the elements V1, V2,
V3 is cOonfigured to allow communication from two source network cards, SC1P1_1111 and
SC1P2_1112. Regardless of what is physically in between these two points, information
coming from these sources would be accepted.
The two security mechanisms (allow list and port exposure) are relatively simple. However,
even with these two mechanisms, there is apparent complexity built into the network. A
network manager can decide through which ports the communication would pass and to
which destination, but in order to make the system work, all configurations must be aligned. A
change may lead to misalignment and to communication not flowing. However, with the
redundancy built into the system, a network manager is likely to miss the error as the network
will continue to work. Human errors are assumed to remain latent if the do not cause an
interruption of service. However after MTTFixH of 18 months, the errors would be found
and fixed.
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Results
Timeline
The following table represents a single future timeline. Note how some events lead to service
failures (red), fix attempts (yellow) and fixes (green). Also note that events that led to a failure
are fixed at the same timeframe of the service fix. Events that are marked with "from:/xi to's" are
lapses or slips of operators during logical configuration changes.
This is a single timeline that spans ten years of simulation. The case study is comprised of
5,000 simulations done for each one of the sub cases, a total of 20,000 timelines. The results
were stored in a database (MySQL, 2007) and the reports were produced using a combination
of the open source reporting solution from Pentaho and JReport (Pentaho, 2007) as well as
spreadsheet software.
Examples in the timeline:
The following timeline is a typical timeline for the original configuration and contains over
twenty failures over the course of ten years of simulation. The following examples illustrate a
number of interesting examples on the timeline.
1. On date 03/19/2008 18:47, a socket adaptor fails. As it is not causing any immediate
service failure, it remains latent until 08/04/2008 01:51 where an incorrect logical
configuration change (as a result of a lapse or a slip), caused the HostService to fail. As
a part of the fix procedure, both issues were fixed at 08/13/2008 09:33. Note that the
effect length was 7.7 hours.
2. On date 02/05/2009 13:38, one of the electricity grid - Grid_1 failed. That leads to
the failure of the grid service. Once fixed, the service is operational again after 6.37
hours. As a result of the fact that exogenous utilities are considered 'monitored' in the
thesis model, the grid is fixed before it can have an effect on any of the services. Under
these conditions, in almost all cases, grid failures generated a service failure only if
there was a latent condition existing in the infrastructure. This timeline does not
contain such an event sequence.
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3. On date 01/21/2010 13:11, Line card of switch2 failed. As a result of a latent failure of
socket adaptor 9 on 12/28/2008 02:07, the line card failure lead to HostService to fail.
The two issues are fixed at 01/21/2010 20:33, after 7.37 hours.
Table 3 - A single future timeline
Future Time
03/19/2008 18:47
08/04/2008 03:10
08/13/2008 01:51
08/13/2008 01:51
08/13/2008 09:31
08/13/2008 09:32
08/13/2008 09:33
08/13/2008 09:33
10/04/2008 04:18
12/28/2008 02:07
02/05/2009 13:38
02/05/2009 13:38
02/05/2009 20:00
02/05/2009 20:01
02/05/2009 20:01
03/05/2009 00:24
03/16/2009 04:55
08/29/2009 11:56
10/01/2009 20:00
10/04/2009 07:30
10/28/2009 09:05
12/18/2009 22:51
01/21/2010 13:11
01/21/2010 13:11
01/21/2010 20:32
01/21/2010 20:33
01/21/2010 20:33
01/21/2010 20:33
03/02/2010 10:15
03/22/2010 01:13
09/08/2010 02:08
09/08/2010 02:08
09/08/2010 10:38
09/08/2010 10:39
09/08/2010 10:39
09/08/2010 10:40
10/10/2010 03:33
10/14/2010 19:13
Service
Event Name ID
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_40 ....
Type:POREXPOSURE NR1n-V1 from:/4000003/ to: 0Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_1 n_V1 from:/4000003/ to://0
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_8
HW Break: SOCKET ADAPTOR ScAdDt 9
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_11
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_4_n V4 from:/S1C2P_1 112/ to://l
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_1_nV1 from:/S1C2P_1112/ to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_2_nV2 from:/4000003/ to://
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_1_ofServer_Server1
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_3_nV3 from:/4000003/ to://
HW Break: LINE-CARD LC_3. r.• LC-• RE...HW Break: LINECARD LC_3_r_LC_3_RE
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_5
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_8
HW Fix: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_5
0
0
0
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Effecct length
First
failService State
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.70196
0
0
0
0
S 0
S6.37581
0
S 0
0
I 0
0
a 0
S 0
S 0
0
0
0
0
7.37115
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8.52998
0
0
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_6_ofSwitch2
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_7_ofResourceEncl
__ _
k eric Brak Hotarvie
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10/15/2010 19:21
04/17/2011 19:17
04/21/2011 06:48
07/10/2011 23:08
01/14/2012 00:26
04/10/2012 08:14
04/24/2012 16:35
08/20/2012 10:01
09/02/2012 23:57
10/25/2012 22:51
10/28/2012 11:27
10/28/2012 11:27
10/28/2012 13:56
10/28/2012 13:57
10/28/2012 13:57
11/11/2012 11:01
12/26/2012 05:53
03/12/2013 14:25
04/18/2013 10:32
04/18/2013 10:32
04/18/2013 13:41
04/18/2013 13:42
04/18/2013 13:42
04/18/2013 13:42
09/14/2013 15:27
09/14/2013 15:27
09/14/2013 20:49
09/14/2013 20:49
09/14/2013 20:50
09/14/2013 20:50
02/21/2014 09:51
04/16/2014 01:17
07/07/2014 19:52
07/07/2014 19:52
07/07/2014 23:12
07/07/2014 23:13
07/07/2014 23:14
07/07/2014 23:14
12/15/2014 03:52
01/22/2015 03:21
01/22/2015 03:21
01/22/2015 07:28
01/22/2015 07:28
01/22/2015 07:28
01/25/2015 16:12
01/25/2015 16:13
01/25/2015 19:35
01/25/2015 19:35
01/25/2015 19:35
03/26/2015 21:34
HW Break: FAN FAN_8ResourceEncl
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NRlnV1 from:/3000002/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_2_nV2 from:/S1C2P_1112/to://
HW Break: SWITCH Switchi
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_2 nV2 from:/3000002/ to://
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_5_ofSwitch2
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_4_n_V4 from:/S1C1P_1 111/to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR 3_nV3 from:/3000002/ to://
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC-14
TvnA-AI I OW I ISTNR 1 n V1 from:/SlClP 1111/toI//
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_2_r_LC_2_SW2
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: LINE CARD LC 2 r LC 2 SW2
0
0
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_5 0
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_4_ofSwitchi 0
HW Break: FAN FANlServerServerl 0
HW Break: FAN FAN_2Server_Serverl 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: FAN FAN 1lServer_Serverl 0
HW Fix: FAN FAN_2ServerServerl 0
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS 2 of Server Serverl 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: POWER SUPPLY PS_1_ofServerServerl 0
HW Fix: POWERSUPPLY PS_2_ofServerServerl 0
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_4_n_V4 from:/3000002/ to:// 0
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_4_n_V4 from:/4000003/ to:l// 0
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS _8_of_ResourceEncl 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: POWER_SUPPLY PS_8_ofResourceEncl 0
HW Fix: POWER_SUPPLY PS_7 of_ResourceEncl 0
T ype:ALLOWLIST NR3n_3 from/Sl Cl P_1111/to:// 0
Tvpe:PORT EXPOSURE NR3 n V3 from:/4000003/ to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_3_n_V3 from:// to:/4000003/
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR 2_nV2 from:/4000003/to://l
Twina-POPT PYPCZl PP KIP & n 'JO frm-// /n4AAAAAl
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_2_nV2 from:/S1C2P_l 112/ to://
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.494
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.16971
0
0
0
0
0
0
5.39041
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.3601
0
0
0
0
4.12194
0
0
0
0
0
3.38099
0
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03/26/2015 21:34
03/27/2015 00:54
03/27/2015 00:54
03/27/2015 00:54
04/04/2015 13:22
04/16/2015 05:17
05/26/2015 12:58
05/29/2015 21:52
05/29/2015 21:52
05/30/2015 02:01
05/30/2015 02:01
05/30/2015 02:01
08/11/2015 00:00
09/22/2015 15:42
09/22/2015 15:42
09/22/2015 22:07
09/22/2015 22:08
09/22/2015 22:08
10/10/2015 17:34
01/08/2016 04:07
03/29/2016 04:04
06/18/2016 16:58
06/25/2016 16:40
06/25/2016 16:40
06/25/2016 20:31
06/25/2016 20:31
06/25/2016 20:32
07/12/2016 06:59
07/12/2016 06:59
07/12/2016 11:04
07/12/2016 11:05
07/12/2016 11:05
07/12/2016 11:05
08/19/2016 08:03
08/19/2016 08:03
08/19/2016 13:36
08/19/2016 13:36
08/19/2016 13:36
10/15/2016 15:51
10/24/2016 12:49
12/11/2016 07:51
02/14/2017 16:25
02/21/2017 04:40
03/13/2017 04:42
03/13/2017 04:42
03/13/2017 13:25
03/13/2017 13:26
03/13/2017 13:26
04/23/2017 07:25
08/31/2017 23:22
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_2_n_V2 from:// to:/S1C2P_1 112/
HW Break: FAN FAN_5Switch2
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR 2 nV2 from:/S1C1P_ 111/ to://
Tvpe:ALLOWLIST NR_4_nV4 from:/S1C2P_ 1112/ to://
HW Break: LINECARD LC_2_rLC_2_SW2
HW Fix: I INF CARD IC 9 r IC 9 SW9
e:ALLOW LIST NR 1 
/
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR__n_V1 from:/4000003/ to://
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_1_n_V1 from:// to:/4000003/
0
0
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS 7 ofResourceEnci
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NRinV1 
from:/300000 to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE 
NR_4_nV4 from:/4000003/ 
to://
P:e ORT EXPOSURE NR 4 n V4 from:/3000002/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_3_n_V3 from:/S1C2P_1112/ to://
Tvoe:ALLOW LIST NR 3 n V3from://to:/S1C2P 1112/
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS8_of_ResourceEncl 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: POWERSUPPLY PS 8 of ResourceEncl
HW Fix: POWER SUPPLY PS 7 of ResourceEncl
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_1_nV1 from://to:/S1C2P_1112/
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_7_of_ResourceEncl
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR-3_nV3 from:/3000002/ to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_2_n V2 from:/3000002/ to://
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_1_of_Server_Serverl
HW Break: FAN FAN 2Server Server1
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_2_ r LC_2_SW2
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: LINE CARD LC_2_r_LC_2_SW2
0
0
e:ALLOW LIST NR 3 
/
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0
0
3.32927
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.15949
0
0
0
0
0
6.42384
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.86203
0
0
0
0
0
4.10853
0
0
0
5.55716
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8.72105
0
-1 0
_ ___ ___ _
I-Se'rvic_ Bra :_st e v
IvDe:ALLUW LI•I INH 1 n V1 from:/•51u1H llll/tO:H
realký Hostiprvic&
I Service Be
. ... .... -- B reak: ._ . . .. .. .. . .
IV~~~e:ALL•JW ~ '' LI5 H3nV to :/ f1 11t:
F ric Bra:H s er_ _
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08/31/2017 23:22
09/01/2017 04:33
09/01/2017 04:34
09/01/2017 04:34
09/01/2017 04:35
10/09/2017 10:51
11/26/2017 13:29
11/26/2017 13:29
11/26/2017 19:27
11/26/2017 19:28
11/26/2017 19:28
03/25/2018 01:53
03/25/2018 01:53
03/25/2018 05:46
03/25/2018 05:46
03/25/2018 05:47
03/25/2018 10:12
03/25/2018 10:12
03/25/2018 15:15
03/25/2018 15:16
03/25/2018 15:16
03/25/2018 15:16
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_2_of_ServerServerl
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: POWER_SUPPLY PSlofServerServerl
HW Fix: POWERSUPPLY PS_2_of_Server_Serveril
T e:ALLOWLISTNR_4_n_V41fromSlClIP 1111/to:ll 0
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_1_nV1 from:/4000003/ to:l// 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NRnV1 from://to:/4000003/ 0
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_2_n_V2 fromS C2P_ 1112/ to:/l 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
aT e:ALLOW-LIST NR_2_n-V2 from:// toJSlC2P_1112/ 0
HW Break: GRID Grid_2 0
Service Fix Attempt: HostService
HW Fix: POWERSUPPLY PS_7_of_ResourceEncl 0
HW Fix: GRID Grid 2
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5.20991
0
0
0
0
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5.97964
0
0
0
0
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0
0
0
0
5.07545
0
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Reliability
The following graphs show the reliability of the configurations.
Reliability - one month
0.07
0.06
0.05
0
. 0.04
C.
8 0.030.
0.02 -
0.01
0
12/1/2007 12/8/2007 12/15/2007
-- SERVCBL_DISC Date
- SERVCBLCONNCTSLIP
- RES_ENCCBLCONNCTSLIP
- ORIGINAL
12/22/2007 12/29/2007
Figure 20 - Case study, reliability of first month
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Reliability - one year
U. I
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0.4
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0.2
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0
- SERVCBLDISC
SERVCBL_CONNCTSLIP
- RES_ENCCBL_CONNCTSLIP
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Date
Figure 21 - Case study, reliability of first year
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Reliability - long term
Figure 22 - Case study, reliability long term horizon
Figure 20, Figure 21 and Figure 22 shows the reliability graphs of all four configurations, in
different time horizons. Looking at the probability of a service failure (HostService) after two
weeks, it is clear that the ORIGINAL configuration that is comprised of multiple layers of
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Case Study
redundancy (See Figure 14 - Case study base configuration, page 9), is superior to the other
architectures that reflect three different changes. It is clear that the SERV_CBL_DISC (See
Figure 15 - Case study first change - cable disconnect, Page 9) is the worst one in terms of
reliability, and reflects a risk of -10% or service interruption. That risk is about ten times more
than the original configuration. However, the SERV_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP, and
RES_ENC_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP configurations (See Figure 16, and Figure 17, Page 9),
represents a better alternative than SERV_CBL_DISC. The reason for that is that although the
connections were incorrect (a slip) and redundancy was lost to an extent, the two cables going
out of the server in the SERV_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP configuration and the two cables going
out of the resource enclosure in the RES_ENC_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP configuration,
represents a small advantage in the form of network adaptor redundancy on the server or
socket adaptor on the resource enclosure side, as well as switch ports redundancy. In the short
term horizon (Figure 21) it is a significant difference. The two cable connection slip
configurations are not identical in terms of reliability, and the
RES_ENC_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP looks like it is slightly better than
SERV_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP. This can be attributed to the fact that they reflect a slightly
different risk. On the server side there are two network adaptors and on the resource
enclosure - only one line card.
After a year, the chances of having a service interruption with the original configuration are
around 25% while the other configurations are 38%- 5 5%.
These results show how even changes that may seem very subtle in first observation, can be
differentiated and quantified. This may be a valuable tool for comparing and evaluating
different network configurations.
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Un-Availability and Expected Loss
Figure 23 shows the un-availability for all configurations.
Unavailability of All Configurations - Monthly
0.060%
0.055%
0.050%
0.045%
0.040%C.
0.035%
. 0.030%
0
S0.025%
.o 0.020%
0
0.015%
0.010%
0.005%
0.000%
2 7 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Time
---- ORIGINAL -*-SERVCBL DISC SERV CBLCONNCT SLIP -+-RESENC CBLCONNCTSLIP
Figure 23 - Case study, un-availability of all configurations
The original configuration has more layers of redundancy and as a result, the probability of a
service being unavailable at any given day is lower than other configurations. Again, depending
on certain time frames, the original configuration is distinctly better than the other
configurations. Note that the unavailability information is much noisier than the reliability is,
because a substantially less data points are used for each point in the graph.
It is interesting to note that in some places along the graph the unavailability seems to be
declining (for example serv_cbl_disc during parts of 2010). In multiple runs performed with
the same conditions, this type of behavior was sometimes observed at other locations along
the timeline. Again, this behavior is assumed to be related to the substantially low amount of
data points comprising this graph. Since each of the scenarios was run with 5,000 future
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timelines, a month with unavailability of 0.04% represents an average unavailability time of
about 17 min per month, or about 285 failure events at a certain month, out of the 5,000
future timelines. Since the number of failures is so low, there is a high degree of sensitivity in
the results with regards to the number of failures. A much larger run (with a higher number of
timelines) is needed to verify that point (for example by one or two orders of magnitude). Such
run was not performed due to time and resources required.
As a result of the differences in availability, the expected losses are different. These cumulative
losses are described in Figure 24 and Figure 25 comparing all four configurations. The
expected loss after 6 months varies from -$5,600 to ~$11,200 a difference of about 2x.
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Accumulated expected loss
SQC
V
Date
-ORIGINAL
- SERV_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP
- SERV_CBL_DISC
- RES_ENC_CBL_CONNCT_SLIP
Figure 24 - Case study, expected losses over time, short term
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
©O 2007 Gadi Oren
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
's
csz/
Case Study
Accumulated expected loss
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Figure 25 - Case study - expected losses over time, long term
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Importance Measure
Importance measures were calculated as follows: whenever an event was found to be a part of
a root cause (either immediate or latent) its contribution to the failure was measured. For
example, if two fans fail and lead to the resource enclosure failure and a service failure, each
fan failure even has 0.5 contribution weight, and the redundancy index is calculated as
lcontribution and is 2. If an additional event is participating in an 'and' relationship, for example,
the server failed, there are two causal chains server, fan1 or server, fan2. In that case, the first
chain weighs 0.5 and each piece of the chain is 0.25. Eventually, the server weight is 0.5 and
each fan is 0.25. The redundancy index is 4 for each fan and 2 for the server.
The importance report show each event that participated in a failure, the weighted average of
expected cost (contribution * failure price). The report also presents the average redundancy
level. A redundancy index of 1 indicates clearly on a non-redundant event (component failure
or logical configuration). A redundancy index of 2 or more is a well redundant event. The
expected price is not necessarily correlated to the redundancy index because it depends on the
estimated value of the effected service.
The original configuration Figure 26 - page 9, presents a relatively low distribution of
importance. The highest importance is of the server and the resource enclosure, as they are
both single points of failure with a redundancy index of 1.0. The line cards follow closely, as
they are almost less redundant with a redundancy index or -1.8. Note that the 90t'h percentile
rows are highlighted.
The serv_cable_disc configuration presents a substantial shift of importance to configurations
on one side of the network (S 1C1P_1111 represents the ID of one resource enclosure port,
and 3000002 is one of the servers port IDs). The two other configurations have a cable
connected incorrectly but the other side ports are still in use, and the importance is shifted
accordingly. On Figure 27 - page 9, the differences between the original configuration and the
first change - server cable disconnect are presented. It is interesting to note that with the
original configuration, the importance of logical configurations of the network resources V1,
V2, V3 are low and well distributed in the figure. However, after the change, a steep increase in
the importance is associated with one 'side' of the configuration while the other 'side' loses all
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importance. The same happens to some of the hardware components, for example line card 1
of switch 1, and line card 3 of the resource enclosure. This clearly shows how the components
or configurations that are 'out of the game' as a result of a change, loses their importance while
their previously redundant counterparts become single points of failure and get a
disproportionate share as a cause of expected future losses. Figure 28 - page 89, presents the
measures when the two server ports are connected to one 'side'. As an entire 'side' is disabled,
but the storage ports are still redundant and as a result the importance of the three
configurations related to S 1C 1P_1111 and S 1C2P_1112 reduces (as both server ports are still
usable) while configurations related to the resource enclosure port 30000002 becomes very
important (as only one resource enclosure port is usable). Note that even though the cable is
incorrectly connected, it is allowing information to flow. The exposure configuration changes
dramatically, when all the configurations related to 30000002 become the most important
items with redundancy index 1.0 and configurations related to 40000003 become irrelevant
because they are related to the inactive side. Figure 29 - page 91, related to incorrect
connection of cable from the resource enclosure, presents a situation where the resource
enclosure side connections are all somewhat more important and remain relevant (redundancy
index 1.94) and here the server side configurations S1C1P_1111 become the most important
items with redundancy 1.0 and their counterparts S1C2P_1112 become irrelevant. In this case,
information can flow through the two cables coming from the resource enclosure to the same
switch, but only one server cable is active.
By reviewing the importance measures details it is possible to understand how three different
changes has such different risk profiles, while they all cause a (conceptually) similar situation:
disable the information flow on the right hand side of the network. Figure 30 - page 92, shows
a comparison between the two cable-slip configurations. There is symmetry between the
importance shift on the resource enclosure side and the server side depending on where the
slip took place. The slight difference between the two configurations in terms of reliability can
be attributed to the fact the hardware related importance is different between the two and
break the symmetry.
These importance-measures present information from the point of view of impact on the
business. Failures or changes that may look similar in terms of engineering importance and
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probability may have different impacts on different services. Allowing a triage process that is
driven by the business impact will assist with aligning the IT operations with business goals.
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Element importance report
Table 4 - Importance report for original configuration
Configuration
Event Name
ORIGINAL
HW Break: CABLE CBL •1
HW Break: CABLE CBL_2
HW Break: CABLE CBL_3
HW Break: CABLE CBL_4
HW Break: FAN FANIServer_Serverl
HW Break: FAN FAN_2Server_Serverl
HW Break: FAN FAN.7ResourceEncl
HW Break: FAN FAN_8ResourceEncl
HW Break: GRID Grid_
HW Break: GRID Grid_2
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_1_rLC_1_SW1I
HW Break: LINECARD LC 2 r LC 2 SW2
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_3 r LC_3_RE
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_4 r LC_4_RE
HW Break: NET ADAPTOR NA _r S1CIP_1111
HW Break: NETADAPTOR NA_2_rS1C2P_1112
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_1_ofServerServer1
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_2_ofServerServerl
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_7_ofResourceEnc1
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_8_ofResourceEncl
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_1
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_10
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_11
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_12
HW Break: RESOURCE-ELEMENT NRC_2
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_3
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_4
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_5
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_6
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_7
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_8
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_9
HW Break: RESOURCEENCLOSURE ResourceEnc1
HW Break: SERVER Server_Server1
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt28
HW Break: SOCKET_ADAPTOR ScAdpt_29
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_35
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_40
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_88
HW Break: SOCKET_ADAPTOR ScAdpt_9
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$81.97
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$13.14
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$13.51
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$1,042.12
$966.97
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$940.82
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$967.51
Case Study
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR 1 n V1 from:/S1C2P_ 1112/to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR 2 n V2 from:/S1C2P_l 112/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_3_nV3 from:/S1C2P_1112/to://Type:PORT EMPOSTJS$ NtJdfRa-00084:
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR 1_nVi from:/4000003/to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR2_nV2 from:/4000003/to:
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_3_nV3 from:/4000003/ to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR3nV384 Risk Managemeto:
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Figure 26 - Importance measure for the original configuration
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
© 2007 Gadi Oren
Case Study
Table 5 - Importance report for server disconnect slip configuration
SERV CBL DISC
HW Break: CABLE CBL1
HW Break: CABLE CBL_3
HW Break: FAN FAN_1 ServerServerl
HW Break: FAN FAN_2Server_Serveri
HW Break: FAN FAN_7ResourceEncl
HW Break: FAN FAN_8ResourceEncl
HW Break: GRID Grid_ 1
HW Break: GRID Grid_2
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_-1-.r._LC1_SW1
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_3 r LC_3_RE
HW Break: NETADAPTOR NA_1-_rSICiP_1111
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS 1 of ServerServerl
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_2_ofServer_ Serverl
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_7_of ResourceEncl
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_8_ofResourceEncl
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_1
HW Break: RESOURCE-ELEMENT NRC_10
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_11
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_12
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_2
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_3
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_4
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_5
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_6
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC 7
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_8
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_9
HW Break: RESOURCE_ENCLOSURE ResourceEncl
HW Break: SERVER Server.Serverl
HW Break: SOCKET_ADAPTOR ScAdpt_35
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAd t_8
HW Break: SOCKET_ADAPTOR ScAdpt_9
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_InV1 from:/S1C1 P_1 111/ to://l
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_2_nV2 from:/S1C1P_1111/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_3_nV3 from:/S1C1P_1111/ to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_1_nV1 from:/3000002/to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_2_nV2 from:/3000002/to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_3_nV3 from:/3000002/ to://
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Event Name
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Figure 27 - Importance comparison of original and first change,
server cable disconnect
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Table 6 - Importance report for server connection slip configuration
Confiquration SERV CBL CONNCT SLIP
Event Name
HW Break: CABLE CBL_1
HW Break: CABLE CBL_2
HW Break: CABLE CBL3
HW Break: FAN FAN_1 Server_Serverl
HW Break: FAN FANt2ServerServeri
HW Break: FAN FAN_7ResourceEncl
HW Break: FAN FAN_8ResourceEncl
HW Break: GRID Grid_1
HW Break: GRID Grid_2
HW Break: LINECARD LC_1 r LC_1_SW1I
HW Break: LINECARD LC 3RErLC_3_RE
HW Break: NET_ADAPTOR NA_1 r S1C1P_1111
HW Break: NET ADAPTOR NA_2-r S1C2P_1112
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_1_ofServer_Server1
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_2_ofServerServerl
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_7_ofResourceEncl
HW Break: POWER-SUPPLY PS_8_of ResourceEndc
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_1
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_10
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_11
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_12
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_2
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_3
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_4
HW Break: RESOURCE.ELEMENT NRC- 5
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_6
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC.7
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_8
HW Break: RESOURCE-ELEMENT NRC_9
HW Break: RESOURCE_ENCLOSURE ResourceEncd
HW Break: SERVER Server_Serveri
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_13
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdptK35
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_8
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt9
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_1_nV1 from:/S1C1P_1111/to://
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_1 _nVi from:/S1 C2P1..112/ to://
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_2_nV2 from:/S1C1P_1111/to://
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_2_nV2 from:/SIC2P_1112/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_3 nV3 from:/S1C1P_1 111/to://
Type:ALLOWLIST NR_3 nV3 from:/S1C2P_1112/ to:!!
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_1_nV1 from:/3000002/ to://
Type:PORTEXPOSURE NR_2_nV2 from:/3000002/ to:!/
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_3_nV3 from:/3000002/ to://
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Figure 28 - Importance comparison of original and second change,
server connection slip
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Table 7 - Importance report for resource enclosure connection slip
configuration
Configquration RES ENC CBL CONNCT SLIP
Event Name
HW Break: CABLE CBL_1
HW Break: CABLE CBL_3
HW Break: CABLE CBL 4
HW Break: FAN FAN_1Server_Serverl
HW Break: FAN FAN_2Server_Serveri
HW Break: FAN FAN_7ResourceEncl
HW Break: FAN FAN_8ResourceEnc1
HW Break: GRID Grid_1
HW Break: GRID Grid_2
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_1_rLC_1_SW1
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC 3 r LC_3_RE
HW Break: LINE_CARD LC_4 r LC_4_RE
HW Break: NETADAPTOR NA_1 rS1C 1 P_1111
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_1_ofServer_Server1
HW Break: POWER SUPPLY PS 2_of Server Serverl
HW Break: POWER_SUPPLY PS_7_ofResourceEncl
HW Break: POWERSUPPLY PS_8_ofResourceEncl
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_1
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_10
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_11
HW Break: RESOURCE-ELEMENT NRC_12
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_2
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_3
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_4
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_5
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_6
HW Break: RESOURCEELEMENT NRC_7
HW Break: RESOURCE_ELEMENT NRC_8
HW Break: RESOURCE ELEMENT NRC_9
HW Break: RESOURCE_ENCLOSURE ResourceEncl
HW Break: SERVER Server Serverl
HW Break: SOCKET_ADAPTOR ScAdpt_12
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt35
HW Break: SOCKET_ADAPTOR ScAdpt_40
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt8
HW Break: SOCKETADAPTOR ScAdpt_9
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_-_nV1 from:/S1C1P_11 11/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR_2_nV2 from:/S1C1P_1111/ to://
Type:ALLOW_LIST NR _3_nV3 from:/S1C1 P_1 111/ to://l
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_1_n V1 from:/3000002/to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_1_nV1 from:/4000003/ to:!
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_2_nV2 from:/3000002/ to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_2_nV2 from:/4000003/to://
Type:PORT_EXPOSURE NR_3_nV3 from:/3000002/ to://
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Figure 29 - Importance comparison of original and third change,
resource enc. Connection
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure
©C) 2007 Gadi Oren
1.97 $3,664.48
7,=0 t0D0 12.100 16.00 17.100 2D=00 2M.0I_
II)
Ilrl
Case Study
0 2.50 5A= 7=0 101O 129M 15= 177AO l20= 221M
HW k CABLE CBL1
HVW &te: CABLE COL 3-HW &a kCABLE CB 4
HW Yeale FAN FAN-Sava Swrwrl
HW &az*Lk FAN FAN 29w-er Swo 1
14W BraW. FAN FAIýRaktodErol
W W &ak FAN FA Rm
HwwOak GM Cnd 1
HW BeW GRID id2
HW~~~I BrvII LAECR CI r L I SW I
Nwk t4 - I 1 L 3r :0 t RE,
HW Brok INE-CARD LC 4 r LC 4 RE
HTW&MLTNET APTOR NA SICIPS 1Il1
~)
~1"W &roCo POWER SUPPLY PSD tbi ovwerTirmhW Era*k:POWER UPPLY PS 2 d Sonv S csvexd
MW &aFe POWER SUPPLY PS 7 drE itHW Grak: POWER SUPPLY PS-8d atReeatrowNWM ea RESOURCE V EMENT NRCGNWY &is*; RE'SOURCE ELEMENT NFIC-10
HWek RESOURCE ELEIENTNRC11
9 W &Rek RESOURCE ELEaMlT NRC 12
HWY SoRESOURCE EGENT NRC 2#iW rd*:1RESOURCE ELAENTNRC 3NW &ML RESQOURCE 0"84T N1RC'Hw eek: RESOURCE EEMENT NRC. 5
HW Be RESOURCE a8MENT NRC 6
HVW Brto* REI-4URCE GEMIENT NRC7
MW bekRESOURCE ELEIENT NAG_8
HW Bra&-'RESOURCE SRIENT NRC 9:
TW GwasL SERVER Suwiar SaIr
HVY Break: SOCKET ADAPTOR Sc 1O2
HWY &a*: SOCXET ADAPTOR Sdo5g_....
HW hank: SOCKET ADAPTOR SA4
HW &v* N SOCKETADAPTOR Sz9*
44W BrW SOCKT APTORSakOI 9TI piU ST#I NR3l I n VI an)MIl 11 V k t'y
Typo:MLLUVV LST NRYS V2 *=,IC IP I 1 I£ l C L V W,
FgyputreU3CWm sT NbetweVe ttheawnlip Ii ca blelconnection9pe2 WT isk MAanaRge enn i Msn ic ITInt36astc
Typa:CGRT (POSURE NR 1 k2a007adi0O IenTy efRv~TEifW19RF NR 2-n V2 6arnA00=W-fY r
Tywef0RTý E)POSURE NR 3 n V2 kewl0003 IMP
Type PORT EXPOSURE NR 3 as V3 Iran MOMD03 trO
HW &a*-, CARE COL 2
HW &mlL NET ADAPTOR NA 2 rSICP 1112NW remký SOCKET ADAPTOR Sc*013
TypeMLOW UST NR I n Vl rarn S1C2P ,11120 Wr
TypwALLOW tIST NR 2_n V2 ktreat sic2P 11131 saW
TypeakLO LJST NR n V3 *eMnSC2P 1112V Wr
Figure 30 -Comparison between the two slips in cable connection
Cost Distfibution over Time
Each one of the configuration discussed creates a different expected accumulated cost over
time as can be seen in Figure 25, in page 79. However, these lines represent the expected cost
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/ loss or the average of a distribution. In order to better understand what the distributions are,
a detailed description of how they change over time is presented here. Original:
Cost Distribution over Time: Original
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Figure 31 - Cost Distribution over Time: Original (3D)
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Figure 32 - Cost Distribution over Time: Original (Top)
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Cable disconnect:
Cost Distribution over Time: Cable Disconnect
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Figure 33 - Cost Distribution over Time: Cable Disconnect (3D)
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Figure 34 - Cost Distribution over Time: Cable Disconnect (Top)
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Server connection slip:
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Figure 35 - Cost Distribution over Time: Server Con Slip (3D)
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Interesting to note that close to time 0 (the month of dec-2007), most of the volume of the
distribution is concentrated on the lower left. The reason is that early in the timeline, there is a
very high probability of having cost of $0. As time progresses, some of the volume is
transferred from the left to the rest of the distribution, as can be seen in Figure 39. Note that
the original configuration has a relatively concentrated distribution on the left comparing with
the other configurations during the first year. Over time, all configurations become lower and
wider spread to the right.
Cost Distribution over Time: Cable Disconnect
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Figure 39 - Cable disconnect distribution over time - larger scale
Cost Benefit Analysis: ITArchitecture Decisions and Business Aignment
One the results of this case study is the ability to compare architectures using a number of
measurements. The measures of reliability and availability are always important, but are opaque
in most cases because of system complexity. Furthermore, the ability to measure the expected
loss of each architecture design decision, allows choosing the best design to fit the goals of the
organization, as well as justifying that decision. In the case study, if the two cable-misconnect
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lapses were two architectures that an organization should have chosen from, this decision
would have been a very difficult one to make and most likely would have been done in a
qualitative manner. With the suggested methodology, this decision and even more complex
ones can be made. Also, in most cases, an architecture decision would have a cost associated
with it (the cost for doing the work and the cost of replacing or adding components). Figure
24 on page 78 shows the expected loss for six months. The difference between the
disconnected cable configuration and the original configuration can be found by abstracting
two points from the same time on the graph. However, as presented in the cost benefit
section, comparing two expected values may be misleading. After understanding better how
the distribution of cost / losses change over time, we can isolate one point in time, a year after
the beginning of the timeline:
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Figure 40 - Loss distribution after one year for all configurations
Each one is a random variable and for the following example, we will use the original
configuration distribution and the cable-disconnect configuration distribution.
Let's consider the following example: Assuming that a cable disconnected and in three
different locations:
a. The cable was disconnected in the data center. The equipment belongs to a
customer that will pay for fixing it is $15,000.
b. The cable was disconnected in the data center in an accessible place. The cost
of fixing is $0.
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c. The cable was disconnected in a remote site in a desert. The cost of sending a
technician is $8,000
The organization requires an ROI within ly.
Discounted Profit / Loss (cost -$15,000)
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Figure 41 - Discounted profit / loss, for payment of $15,000
The discount rate is 12%. In the first case (a), the distribution is shown in Figure 41. The cost
is -$15,000, the expected discounted profit in that case is $26,564, and the probability of loss is
17.16%.
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Figure 42 - Discounted profit / loss, for no cost
In the second case (b), the distribution is shown in Figure 42. The cost is $0.00, the expected
discounted profit is $11,717 and the probability of loss is 40.03%
Risk Management in Mission-Critical IT Infrastructure 101
© 2007 Gadi Oren
Discounted Profit/ Loss (cost $0.00)
Density Function
U.14 -
0.12 -
0.1 -
0.08
-0 0.06
0.04 -
0.02 -
0-
SLoss
M Profit
$
---- T-
--r-T ---7- -i· ---- i -- I 7-7 T-
Case Study
Figure 43 - Discounted profit / loss, for cost of $8,000
In the third case (c), the distribution is shown in Figure 43. The cost is $8,000, the expected
discounted profit is $3,890, and the probability of loss is 54.80%. It is interesting to note that
while the expected profit may be considered worthwhile, as a result of the variance, a loss
probability of more than 40% indicates that options b and c may not be good options.
Addressing Exposure
The case presented two types of information that can be used to address exposure.
First, the importance measure point to the elements in the network that would generate the
highest impact. The high impact can be a result of the fact that the element will affect a very
costly service(s) the setting of the element in the system. It is also possible that the service(s)
impacted are not very costly but the probability of failure is high. In any case, the importance
measure suggests a very simple path of action: add the level of redundancy for that element.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
The goal of this research was to examine how probabilistic methods of risk assessment that are
applied successfully in certain industries can be enhanced and applied to service oriented,
complex and frequently changing IT infrastructures. As IT infrastructure becomes an
important enabler and sometimes even the platform of conducting business for different
industries, the stakes involved with the failure of a service become very high. The ability to
better asses the risk provides an opportunity to better manage that risk.
As noted by previous research efforts, there are a number of challenges in using methods such
as PRA with IT infrastructures. The inherent physical and logical complexity in IT systems
renders traditional methods such as PRA to be non-scalable. Furthermore, IT infrastructures
are systems that contain both equipment and people (designers and operators), and both have
a crucial impact on the risk of service failure. Although well recognized and documented, the
human factor is usually not a part of most of the traditional PRA methods.
The Implication of a Change
Benjamin Disraeli said, "Change is inevitable. Change is constant". This thesis posed a number
of research questions, but throughout there is a common thread: how can the implications of a
change in the infrastructure be found and expressed, in an actionable way, in terms of how
they impact the business. Providing a way to measure the impact of a change leads to
additional questions, such as how to model and include human error as a substantial source of
unintended change, how to account for infrastructure logical configuration, which physical
elements and logical elements are more important than others, and what analytic method
would best lend itself to deal with the estimation of the change implications. Finally, having
answered the previous questions, how can these answers be applied to perform cost benefit
analysis.
Two methods were considered for estimating the implication of a change from a stochastic
point of view. While traditional PRA methods are successfully applied in nuclear and
aerospace installations, the logical and combinatorial complexity inherent to network
infrastructures limits the ability to get an accurate result. Furthermore even a relatively simple
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communication network that contains logical configurations leads to extremely complex PRA
calculations and does not scale well. An alternative method comprised of a combination of
Cellular Automata and Monte Carlo proved to be applicable within reasonable assumptions
and enhancements (with regards to previous research). The thesis suggests a way of
incorporating the wider context of a corporate IT infrastructure - including the human
behavior and errors affecting the system. Using that methodology applied to a case study, this
thesis showed how reliability and availability over time can be calculated.
Application of the Results
The thesis further showed how the profit (or the lack of profit), from a service perspective,
can be used as a common metric to measure the expected loss over time and the importance
measures for each of the physical components, as well as the importance of different logical
configurations. Under different network topologies, logical configurations may become single
points of failure (even though they are non-physical). The importance measurement for logical
configurations and the ability to measure it is especially interesting because during literature
review, no other related work with similar results was found. The case study showed how
network changes that may seem only slightly different from each other lead to clearly
distinguishable differences in the importance measure results. As a result, the suggested
method may be a very good tool for comparing different architectural alternatives or to
understand why two configurations are different and the implications of that difference.
The change of probabilistic distribution of loss over time was studied and based on a future
distribution a financial risk benefit analysis model was presented showing both expected value
as well as the distribution of the result. While certain engineering actions showed an expected
profit, the distribution indicated a substantial probability for a loss. The expected profit or loss
as well as the probability for a loss or a profit are all parameters that should be taken into
consideration in a decision making process.
The ability to quantify the impact of a change, the results of the process described in this thesis
can be used in a number of ways. First, given some operational data (or reasonable
assumptions) an organization can estimate the reliability, availability and importance measures
of the IT networking infrastructure. Second, this information can be used later to asses where
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are the weak points in the network, from a company level point of view. The weakest points
can be reinforced by adding layers of redundancy, be that a physical component or a logical
configuration. Third, multiple proposed engineering changes can be assessed in terms of cost
benefit analysis in order to choose the option to maximize the expected return while
controlling the probability of a loss.
Limitations of This Research
While this thesis found a reasonable working approach to estimate probabilistic measures for
IT network infrastructure, a considerable effort was needed to achieve these results both in
terms of code and in terms of actual computing resources. Although these results would have
been much harder to achieve using traditional PRA, it remains to be seen how well the
suggested method scales. As discussed in the description of CA, this limitation is not inherent,
but any attempt to commercialize this method would require a major effort around scaling up
to larger IT infrastructures.
An inherent issue in this thesis is the fact that the proposed method aims to model human
error and incorporate it into a larger MC and CA model. In a real life environment, people that
operate the network may find such an attempt to be threatening and potentially exposing, a
challenge which may ultimately reduce the usefulness of using such a method. Furthermore,
human error was modeled in a very simplistic way. As human error has high impact on the
results, a different modeling for human error is likely to prove very sensitive to the results.
Finally it is interesting to note that if this method is a good indicator for future impact or
exposure (expected losses) and its results would be implemented on an on-going basis, its
results may become less accurate. On going correction of latent issues indicated by this
method will over time render them to be inaccurate, because the basic assumption that an
issue remains latent as long as there is no interruption of service will become inaccurate.
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Further Work
The conclusions and the limitations above lead to a number of promising areas that were
identified during the research, as possible interesting further research.
Human error is a complex phenomenon. This thesis used a relatively simple model for human
error. Further work can be done around utilization of more advanced models such as the
models suggested by Reason (Reason, 1990).
The thesis touched upon epistemic modeling of the world but did not go very deep into that
direction. Further work can be done in order to establish how an epistemic model can be used.
Using an epistemic model would address the last limitation mentioned above by constantly
updating the basic probabilities of errors and failures. That would also require a detailed
categorization of all physical failures and human errors. Each category would have it own
failure characteristics that would change over time based on data accumulated about failures
over time.
A common cause failure is yet another area that was mentioned but not examined in detail.
This area would make an important possible research subject, since within the IT
infrastructure there are many possible common cause failures. One example is a single
firmware shared by a large number of IT elements may lead to a uniform collapse of a large
part of an IT infrastructure. Another example is sharing the same physical location such as a
data center that suffers a natural disaster.
Finally, modeling weather and natural disasters can be another relevant further direction of
research. Dealing with weather and disasters is very important for an organization and should
be taken into consideration when planning a multi-site infrastructure. Modeling disasters (fires,
earth quakes, floods, hurricanes, etc).is challenging, but since some may have cyclical patterns,
their probability distribution functions may lose the attribute of "memorylessness", an attribute
that the framework developed for the thesis relied on. Can a distribution without
memorylessness be incorporated into the model? How would conditional probability
distribution be used? These would make interesting questions for further research.
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1. BSN: Binary State Network - a network where element failure is binary (working or
not working). See also MSN (Multi State Network)
2. CA: Cellular Automata - A cellular automaton (plural: cellular automata) is a discrete
model studied in computability theory, mathematics, and theoretical biology. It
consists of a regular grid of cells, each in one of a finite number of states. The grid can
be in any finite number of dimensions. Time is also discrete, and the state of a cell at
time t is a function of the states of a finite number of cells (called its neighborhood) at
time t - 1. These neighbors are a selection of cells relative to the specified cell, and do
not change (though the cell itself may be in its neighborhood, it is not usually
considered a neighbor). Every cell has the same rule for updating, based on the values
in this neighborhood. Each time the rules are applied to the whole grid a new
generation is created (Wikipedia, CA, 2007b)
3. IT: Information Technology - as defined by the Information Technology Association
of America (ITAA), is "the study, design, development, implementation, support or
management of computer-based information systems, particularly software
applications and computer hardware." IT deals with the use of electronic computers
and computer software to convert, store, protect, process, transmit and retrieve
information, securely (Wikipedia, IT, 2007a).
4. MC: Monte Carlo Method - Monte Carlo methods are a widely used class of
computational algorithms for simulating the behavior of various physical and
mathematical systems, and for other computations. They are distinguished from other
simulation methods (such as molecular dynamics) by being stochastic, that is
nondeterministic in some manner - usually by using random numbers (in practice,
pseudo-random numbers) - as opposed to deterministic algorithms. Because of the
repetition of algorithms and the large number of calculations involved, Monte Carlo is
a method suited to calculation using a computer, using many computer simulation
techniques (Wikipedia, MC, 2007c).
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5. MSN: Multi State Network - a network where element failure is multi state,
representing different levels of capacity. See also BSN (Binary State Network)
6. NP: In computational complexity theory, NP ("Non-deterministic Polynomial time")
is the set of decision problems solvable in polynomial time on a non-deterministic
Turing machine (Wikipedia, NP, 2007d).
7. NP-hard: NP-hard (nondeterministic polynomial-time hard), in computational
complexity theory, is a class of problems informally "at least as hard as the hardest
problems in NP." NP-hard problems may be of any type: decision problems, search
problems, optimization problems (Wikipedia, NP-hard, 2007e).
8. PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment - a process that is comprised of A. defining the
end states of a system, B. Identification of initiating events, C. Development of event
and fault trees, D. Quantification. The objectives of PRA are: 1. Identification of
accident scenarios, 2. ranking these scenarios according to their probabilities of
occurrence, 3. Rank systems, structures, and components according to their
contribution to various risk metrics (Apostolakis, 2006).
9. PRNG: Pseudo Random Number Generator. An algorithm that generates a set of
numbers that imitate the properties of random numbers. The numbers are not truly
random and are completely determined by a small predetermined set of values.
PRNGs are used in the context of cryptography and Monte Carlo Method simulations.
10. SOA - Service Oriented Architecture is an architectural style that guides all aspects of
creating and using business processes, packaged as services, throughout their lifecycle,
as well as defining and provisioning the IT infrastructure that allows different
applications to exchange data and participate in business processes regardless of the
operating systems or programming languages underlying those applications. SOA
represents a model in which functionality is decomposed into small, distinct units
(services), which can be distributed over a network and can be combined together and
reused to create business applications. These services communicate with each other by
passing data from one service to another, or by coordinating an activity between one
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or more services. It is often seen as an evolution of distributed computing and
modular programming (Wikipedia, SOA, 2007f).
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